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Advice to a Young Policeman[:] . . . Your acts will at all times be
subject to the observation and the animadversion of the public, and on
the stand-point where you commence, and on the course which you
pursue, depends not only much of the welfare of the community in
which you move, but the credit of the department to which you belong,
and your own success as an officer and a man.†
INTRODUCTION
“Get off the motorcycle! Get off the motorcycle! Get off the
motorcycle! State Police . . . put your hands up!”1 off-duty Maryland State
Trooper J.D. Uhler yelled as he jumped out of his car, pulled out his gun,
and ran towards motorcyclist Anthony Graber.2 Trooper Uhler exited his
† EDWARD H. SAVAGE, POLICE RECORDS AND RECOLLECTIONS; OR, BOSTON BY DAYLIGHT AND
GASLIGHT FOR TWO HUNDRED AND FORTY YEARS 341 (Boston, John P. Dale & Co. 1873).
1
Anthony Graber, Motorcycle Traffic Violation—Cop Pulls Out Gun, YOUTUBE (Mar. 10, 2010),
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BHjjF55M8JQ [hereinafter Graber Video I].
2
Peter Hermann, Judge Says Man Within Rights to Record Police Traffic Stop—Charges Alleging
Wire Tap Violation Thrown Out, BALT. SUN (Sept. 27, 2010), http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2010-0927/news/bs-md-recorded-traffic-stop-20100927_1_police-officers-plitt-cell-phones; see also Graber
Video I, supra note 1 (Graber’s footage of his initial interaction with Trooper Uhler); Anthony Graber,
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personal vehicle wearing street clothes and, without displaying his badge,
lunged towards Graber with his .40 caliber semiautomatic pistol readied.3
Graber, a twenty-four-year-old sergeant in the Maryland Air National
Guard,4 was not without a weapon of his own5: he was recording the entire
interaction using a helmet-mounted video camera.6
Graber admits—and his camera proves—that he was speeding and
driving his motorcycle in a reckless manner,7 posing a serious risk both to
himself and to other motorists. Trooper Uhler’s reaction to the situation was
therefore not necessarily unreasonable, although his interaction with Graber
may have initially been more aggressive than was necessary.8 Either way,
Graber’s story does not end with a mere moving violation.
On March 10, 2010, five days after being pulled over by Trooper
Uhler, Graber uploaded the footage he recorded of the incident to
YouTube.9 The Maryland State Police discovered the video on March 15,
201010 and charged Graber with violating Maryland’s wiretapping laws.11
Had Graber been charged only with motor vehicle violations, he would

Motorcycle Traffic Violation—Cop Pulls Out Gun (Extended @o Sound), YOUTUBE (Mar. 10, 2010),
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G7PC9cZEWCQ&NR=1 [hereinafter Graber Video II] (Graber’s
footage of riding his motorcycle and his initial interaction with Trooper Uhler with no sound). These are
the actual videos posted by Graber on March 10, 2010 that caused him to be arrested and face sixteen
years in prison.
3
See Graber Video I, supra note 1. Maryland state troopers carry the Beretta Px4 Storm, “a .40
caliber semi-automatic pistol.” Press Release, Md. State Police, State Police Choosing New Model
Beretta Pistol to Replace Sidearm That Is More Than 10 Years Old (May 8, 2008), available at http://
icac.mdsp.org/media/press_release_details.asp?identifier=614.
4
Hermann, supra note 2.
5
See Lisa A. Skehill, Note, Cloaking Police Misconduct in Privacy: Why the Massachusetts AntiWiretapping Statute Should Allow for the Surreptitious Recording of Police Officers, 42 SUFFOLK U. L.
REV. 981, 1005–06 (2009) (“Lacking the right to . . . record [police], citizens are left without a major
weapon in combating police misconduct.”).
6
Hermann, supra note 2; see also Graber Video I, supra note 1 (posting of recorded video); Graber
Video II, supra note 2 (same).
7
P.J. Orvetti, Time to Cut the Wiretap Law: 1970s Law Doesn’t Fit Modern Times, NBC 4 WASH.
D.C. (June 16, 2010, 11:30 AM), http://www.nbcwashington.com/news/local/Time-to-Cut-the-WiretapLaw-96470009.html.
8
See Annys Shin, From YouTube to Your Local Court: Video of Traffic Stop Sparks Debate on
Whether Police Are Twisting Md. Wiretap Laws, WASH. POST, June 16, 2010, at A1 (stating that when
Trooper Uhler realized that Graber did not pose a threat of fight or flight, he lowered and secured his
firearm); id. (reporting that state police spokesman believed Uhler “acted appropriately”).
9
See id.; Carlos Miller, Motorcyclist Jailed for 26 Hours for Videotaping Gun-Wielding Cop, PIXIQ
(Apr. 16, 2010, 2:46 AM), http://www.pixiq.com/article/maryland-motorcyclist-spends-26-hours-in-jailon-wiretapping-charge-for-filming-cop-with-gun.
10
Miller, supra note 9 (providing image of “Application for Statement of Charges”).
11
State v. Graber, No. 12-K-10-647, 2010 Md. Cir. Ct. LEXIS 7, at *1, *4 (Md. Cir. Ct. Sept. 27,
2010) (citing MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. §§ 10-402(a)(1)–(2), 10-403(a) (LexisNexis 2010));
Miller, supra note 9.
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have faced a maximum fine of $2090;12 but adding the wiretapping
violations meant he faced those fines and up to sixteen years in prison.13
A warrant was issued and six police officers raided Graber’s home at
6:45 AM14 on April 15, 2010.15 The search lasted ninety minutes, during
which the police did not allow Graber’s mother to leave for work or his
sister to go to school.16 The officers seized four computers, several external
hard drives and USB drives, and the camera Graber used to film his
interaction with Trooper Uhler.17 The search would have concluded with an
arrest of Graber had he not been physically unable to leave his home due to
recent gall bladder surgery.18 Graber turned himself in to police a week later
and, after spending twenty-six hours in jail, was released by a judge who
was skeptical that Graber actually violated Maryland’s wiretapping
statutes.19
The applicable Maryland wiretapping statute makes it illegal to
“[w]illfully intercept, [or] endeavor to intercept . . . any wire, oral, or
electronic communication”20 and to “[w]illfully disclose, or endeavor to
disclose, to any other person the contents of any wire, oral, or electronic
communication . . . .”21 The police applied the statute to Graber’s case
because Maryland’s wiretapping statute prohibits interception unless all

12
MD. CODE ANN., TRANSP. § 27-101(g)(3) (providing a maximum fine of $1000 for a conviction
of reckless driving under TRANSP. § 21-901.1(a)); Schedule of Pre-Set Fines and/or Penalty Deposits,
MD. JUDICIARY 46, http://www.courts.state.md.us/district/selfhelp/dccr090chargeonly.pdf (last visited
Mar. 18, 2012) (stating that violations of TRANSP. § 21-801(a) are subject to a $90 fine). Graber was
charged with two counts of violating TRANSP. § 21-901.1 and one count of violating TRANSP. § 21801(a). Graber, 2010 Md. Cir. Ct. LEXIS 7, at *1.
13
See Adam Cohen, Should Videotaping the Police Really Be a Crime?, TIME (Aug. 4, 2010),
http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,2008566,00.html. Graber was charged with two counts
of violating CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 10-402(a), each punishable by up to five years in prison, one count of
violating CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 10-403(a), also punishable by up to five years in prison, and one count of
violating TRANSP. § 21-1126, punishable by up to one year in prison. See CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 10402(b); TRANSP. § 27-101(z); Graber, 2010 Md. Cir. Ct. LEXIS 7, at *1.
14
David Rittgers, Wiretap Law @eeds Update, BALT. SUN, June 1, 2010, at A13.
15
Graber, 2010 Md. Cir. Ct. LEXIS 7, at *5.
16
Rittgers, supra note 14.
17
Id.; Shin, supra note 8.
18
Shin, supra note 8.
19
See Rittgers, supra note 14 (“The penalty [for violating Maryland wiretapping laws] can be up to
five years in prison and up to a $10,000 fine. When the prosecutor asked for a $15,000 bond for a
$10,000 crime, the judge questioned both this maneuver and the use of the law against Mr. Graber.”);
Shin, supra note 8.
20
MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 10-402(a)(1) (LexisNexis 2010).
21
Id. § 10-402(a)(2). The Maryland wiretapping provisions only apply to audio recordings, not to
the video itself. State v. Graber, No. 12-K-10-647, 2010 Md. Cir. Ct. LEXIS 7, at *6 (Md. Cir. Ct. Sept.
27, 2010) (citing Ricks v. State, 520 A.2d 1136, 1139 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1987)). A video recording
without sound would therefore not be subject to prosecution under Maryland law.
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parties consent to it.22 This application is questionable for two reasons. First,
the same statute provides an exception to the all-party consent rule for
police officers if, among other things, the officer is a party to the
conversation.23 Allowing the police a right expressly denied to the public in
the absence of a compelling governmental interest is prima facie
discrimination. Second, the Maryland provision defines “oral
communication” as “any conversation or words spoken to or by any person
in private conversation,”24 and an interaction with a public servant in a
public space can hardly be considered “private.” In fact, Judge Emory Plitt
explicitly stated this in dismissing Graber’s charges: “Those of us who are
public officials and are entrusted with the power of the state are ultimately
accountable to the public. When we exercise that power in public fora, we
should not expect our actions to be shielded from public observation.”25
Anthony Graber’s case presents an extreme example of how far police
and prosecutors are willing to go to prevent the recording and dissemination
of police conduct; however, all-party consent wiretapping statutes are
similarly, albeit less dramatically, misused elsewhere in the United States.26
In Massachusetts, Simon Glik used his cell phone to record police making
an arrest, only to find himself in handcuffs for allegedly violating the state’s
wiretapping statutes.27 In Pennsylvania, police arrested eighteen-year-old

22

§ 10-402(c)(3) (“It is lawful under this subtitle for a person to intercept a wire, oral, or electronic
communication where the person is a party to the communication and where all of the parties to the
communication have given prior consent to the interception . . . .” (emphasis added)).
In a shockingly public admission of abuse of prosecutorial discretion, prosecutor Joseph Cassilly
stated that he refused to dismiss the charges against Graber to highlight the undesirability of an all-party
consent requirement in the hopes that the Maryland Legislature would repeal the provision. See
Recording the Police: Is Citizen Journalism Against the Law?, CATO INST. at 23:27 (Sept. 22, 2010),
http://www.cato.org/event.php?eventid=7427 [hereinafter CATO Video] (statement of Joseph I. Cassilly,
State’s Attorney, Harford County, Maryland).
23
§ 10-402(c)(4)(i) (listing the requirements for the law enforcement officer exception). The statute
does not provide an exception for law enforcement officials to disseminate the recording as Graber did
by posting the videos on the Internet. See id. § 10-401(2)(i). However, the recorded conversation should
still fall outside the statute because interactions between members of the public and police officers are
not private. See infra note 25 and accompanying text.
24
§ 10-401(2)(i) (emphasis added).
25
Graber, 2010 Md. Cir. Ct. LEXIS 7, at *35; see also id. at *17–20 (elaborating on this
conclusion).
26
See, e.g., Kelly v. Borough of Carlisle, 622 F.3d 248 (3d Cir. 2010); Banks v. Gallagher, No.
3:08-1110, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55308 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 18, 2010); Matheny v. Cnty. of Allegheny,
No. 09-1070, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24189 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 16, 2010); Robinson v. Fetterman, 378 F.
Supp. 2d 534 (E.D. Pa. 2005); Commonwealth v. Hyde, 750 N.E.2d 963 (Mass. 2001); Commonwealth
v. Glik, No. 0701-CR-6687, (Bos. Mun. Ct. Jan. 31, 2008), available at http://www.volokh.com/files/
glik.pdf. Thirteen states require both parties to consent to the recording. Seth F. Kreimer, Pervasive
Image Capture and the First Amendment: Memory, Discourse, and the Right to Record, 159 U. PA. L.
REV. 335, 358 & n.76 (2011).
27
John M. Guilfoil, ACLU Files Suit over Cellphone Video of Police, BOS. GLOBE (Feb. 1, 2010,
6:51 PM), http://www.boston.com/news/local/breaking_news/2010/02/_wwwbostoncomne.html.
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Brian Kelly under the state’s felony wiretapping statute for recording a
routine traffic stop.28 In New Hampshire, a disorderly conduct allegation
turned into a Class B felony wiretapping charge with a potential seven-year
prison sentence29 when police discovered a video recording of their arrival
at a house party on twenty-year-old partygoer Adam Whitman’s cell
phone.30
Why are the police31 pursuing citizen videographers so aggressively?
The most likely reason is that police officers fear the potentially damaging32
effect video footage can have on their reputation,33 efficacy,34 and safety.35
This fear is exacerbated by the increasing prevalence of technology36 that
makes it possible to simultaneously capture and edit high-quality videos
and then subsequently disseminate them on the Internet.37 As a result,
“[p]ervasive new camera and video technologies and social networking
practices are creating a new generation of media producers [and]

28

Matt Miller, He’s Cleared in Police Taping—DA Drops Charge Stemming from Carlisle Traffic
Stop, Declares @ew County Policy, PATRIOT-NEWS (Pa.), June 21, 2007, at A1. Kelly sat in jail for
twenty-six hours and was only released when his mother posted her home as security for his $2500 bail.
Id. This case and the Third Circuit’s reasoning in his appeal are discussed in detail infra Part II.B.
29
In New Hampshire, Class B felonies are subject to a punishment of up to seven years in prison.
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 651:2(II)(a) (LexisNexis 2011).
30
Editorial, @o Police Scrutiny; Drop the Camera and Back Away, UNION LEADER (N.H.), July 13,
2010, at A8.
31
The terms “police,” “law enforcement officials,” “government actors,” and “government agents”
are used interchangeably to reflect general usage and because the analysis herein applies to any
individual acting under federal, state, or local law.
32
But see infra Parts IV.C–D (arguing that the potential damage police officers perceive is either
exaggerated or mitigable).
33
E.g., Andrew John Goldsmith, Policing’s @ew Visibility, 50 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 914, 930
(2010) (“New citizen-controlled media technologies and their associated social uses have meant the
seeds of scandal-mongering and reputational damage have been cast much more widely, posing a huge
reputational threat to contemporary police organizations.”).
34
See, e.g., Erik Luna, Transparent Policing, 85 IOWA L. REV. 1107, 1163 (2000) (“Personal
experiences and popular images of police brutality or prejudice only confirm widely held suspicions,
solidifying distrust on both an individual and group level. In turn, community distrust of the police
imposes two very real costs on the criminal justice system. First, members of distrusting communities
will shy away from cooperation with law enforcement, withholding valuable information or creative
solutions to social ills. Second, distrusting individuals are less likely to obey legal commands.”).
35
E.g., Brief of Appellees at 7, Smith v. City of Cumming, 212 F.3d 1332 (11th Cir. 2000) (No. 998199-J), 1999 WL 33618059, at *7 (arguing that police officers fear for their physical safety if they
“constantly hav[e] to look over their shoulder[s] to see where” a videographer is standing and what he is
doing); Kreimer, supra note 26, at 357 & n.74 (“Officers dislike being recorded in embarrassing
situations and may be concerned that dissemination of their images may put them at risk of retaliation.”).
36
See, e.g., Goldsmith, supra note 33, at 915–16. This technology is predominantly sophisticated
mobile phones. See, e.g., David Pogue, @ew iPhone Conceals Sheer Magic, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 2011,
at B1 (describing the ability of the iPhone 4S to take high-definition video clips and subsequently upload
them to the Internet).
37
Pogue, supra note 36.
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consumers, contributing to a ‘disappearance of disappearances’ and thus to
a ‘new visibility’ in policing.”38
While this concern is understandable, preventing citizens from
recording and publishing police conduct is an unconstitutional “prior
restraint” on speech.39 And, although restraining the speech of those wishing
to record police conduct has been litigated, courts have failed to reach a
consensus regarding its constitutionality.40 Existing scholarship argues that
the First Amendment prohibits the police from restricting a person’s right to
record them.41 However, the First Amendment doctrine of prior restraint, a
cousin of freedom of the press,42 has yet to be explored. This Comment
argues that the doctrine of prior restraint can and should be employed to
protect the right of citizens to record police conduct.43
Part I provides basic background on state and federal wiretapping
statutes and discusses the ways police conduct can be recorded. Part II
outlines how courts currently analyze the right and why they should hold

38

Goldsmith, supra note 33, at 915 (citation omitted).
“Prior restraint” refers to a “governmental restriction on speech or publication before its actual
expression.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1314 (9th ed. 2009). A prior restraint arises in this context by
publicly and repeatedly punishing speech after it is shared, leading to a reluctance by members of the
public to engage in it, and, ultimately, in its suppression. See infra Part III.D.
40
See infra Parts II.A–B. This is largely because courts are able to avoid constitutional analysis in
light of recent Supreme Court decisions regarding qualified immunity. See infra Parts II.A–B.
41
See infra Part II.C.3 (listing scholarship that cites the rights to free speech, a free press,
expressive conduct, and redress grievances as reasons the police should not stop citizens from recording
them).
42
Thomas I. Emerson, The Doctrine of Prior Restraint, 20 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 648, 650–51
(1955) (“In England—the immediate source of our doctrine of prior restraint—printing first developed
under royal sponsorship and soon became a monopoly to be granted by the Crown.”).
43
Although the relationship between a citizen recorder, his audience, and police officers is
complex, differences in the form of the recorded conversation (e.g., whether the recording was first
party or third party, stored or disseminated, or on a smartphone or a camcorder) do not change the
underlying constitutional permissibility of citizens recording police conduct. Nor does the timing of a
police officer’s interference (i.e., before, during, or after the recording, or even after the recording has
been publicly disseminated), see also infra Part III, or the form it takes (e.g., verbal request, request
accompanied by threats of imprisonment or violence, or actual imprisonment or violence) change the
analysis. Situations that would change the analysis include those involving legitimate interference in the
officer’s duties (i.e., those that place either the officer or the recorder in danger of physical harm); and
situations that occur in locations where the officer has a reasonable expectation of privacy (e.g., a police
station). See Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78, 84 (1st Cir. 2011) (“[P]eaceful recording of an arrest in a
public space that does not interfere with the police officers’ performance of their duties is not reasonably
subject to [First Amendment time, place, and manner] limitation[s].”); id. (“In such traditional public
spaces [as Boston Common], the rights of the state to limit the exercise of First Amendment activity are
‘sharply circumscribed.’” (quoting Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45
(1983))); see also McKenna v. City of Philadelphia, No. 07-CV-110, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76766, at
*33–34 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 30, 2008) (finding that a police sergeant did not violate a plaintiff’s First
Amendment rights when, as a rule, he allowed filming in a police station’s “public area” but not the
“operations room” that housed “civilians, juveniles[,] . . . undercover police officers[,] . . . paperwork,
equipment[,] and assignments”).
39
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that it is “clearly established.” Part II also summarizes current academic
literature on the subject. Part III defines the doctrine of prior restraint, traces
its relevant development through the American court system, and applies it
to police officers preventing citizens from recording their actions. Finally,
Part IV examines the policy justifications for allowing the public to record
and disseminate footage of police conduct.
I. BACKGROUND
“Wiretapping” is a modern form of eavesdropping44 whereby a third
party intercepts and records a communication between two or more
parties.45 The practice is so named because the communications recorded
originally took place via electric telephone wires that needed to be “tapped”
for the recording to take place.46 The statutory definition of “wiretapping”
has expanded with advances in technology to include intercepting wireless
and oral communications.47 This Part presents an overview of wiretapping
jurisprudence to demonstrate why using all-party consent wiretapping
statutes to prosecute individuals for recording police conduct constitutes
their fundamental misuse.
A. Federal Wiretapping Jurisprudence
Wiretapping has long been outlawed in many states,48 largely due to
concerns that it violates individuals’ right to privacy and their right to be
left alone.49 These concerns gave rise to pivotal Fourth and Fifth

44

“Eavesdropping” is the “act of secretly listening to the private conversation of others without
their consent.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 588 (9th ed. 2009); see also Berger v. New York, 388 U.S.
41, 45 (1967) (“Eavesdropping is an ancient practice . . . . At one time the eavesdropper listened by
naked ear under the eaves of houses or their windows, or beyond their walls seeking out private
discourse.”).
45
See Robert F. Scoular, Wiretapping and Eavesdropping Constitutional Development from
Olmstead to Katz, 12 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 513, 513 (1968).
46
See Berger, 388 U.S. at 46 (“The telephone brought on a new and more modern eavesdropper
known as the ‘wiretapper.” Interception was made by a connection with a telephone line.”); Margaret
Lybolt Rosenzweig, The Law of Wire Tapping, 33 CORNELL L.Q. 73, 73 (1947) (“Wire tapping involves
first a physical interference with wires before the act of listening or interception of messages occurs.”).
47
The modern definition of “electronic communication” is “any transfer of signs, signals, writing,
images, sounds, data, or intelligence of any nature transmitted in whole or in part by a wire, radio,
electromagnetic, photoelectronic or photooptical system that affects interstate or foreign commerce,” 18
U.S.C. § 2510(12) (2006); an “oral communication” is “any oral communication uttered by a person
exhibiting an expectation that such communication is not subject to interception under circumstances
justifying such expectation.” Id. § 2510(2).
48
For example, wiretapping has been prohibited in the state of Washington since 1893. WASH. REV.
CODE § 6559 (1893), reprinted in E. D. MCLAUGHLIN ET AL., THE REVISED STATUTES AND CODES OF
THE STATE OF WASHINGTON 1070 (1896).
49
See Scoular, supra note 45, at 515–16 (discussing the arguments presented in the “first
wiretapping case before the United States Supreme Court”); see also Olmstead v. United States, 277
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Amendment questions in the early twentieth century when law enforcement
officials began eavesdropping and using wiretaps without warrants to gather
evidence for criminal investigations.50 In 1928, the Supreme Court
confronted the Fourth Amendment questions in Olmstead v. United States
but declined to interpret the Fourth Amendment in such a way as to limit
law enforcement’s use of warrantless wiretapping.51
In the wake of Olmstead, wiretapping by law enforcement officials
continued unimpeded until the 1960s.52 By then, technological
advancements such as smaller microphones and the ability to remotely
activate recording devices had greatly expanded the depth and breadth of
observation capabilities,53 increasing instances of wiretapping by members
of the public54 and law enforcement officials alike.55 This dilution of
privacy—in particular, the growing use of wiretapping by law enforcement
officials—troubled the Warren Court and was likely the impetus behind its
1967 decision in Katz v. United States, which overruled Olmstead and held
that wiretapping constituted a search or seizure under the Fourth
Amendment.56 In Katz, law enforcement officials observed Charles Katz
making calls from a specific public telephone booth at regular intervals and,
suspecting illegal activity, taped microphones to the outside of the booth to
record his conversations.57 The recorded conversations revealed that Katz
was calling a known gambler in Massachusetts58 and were subsequently

U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“The makers of our Constitution . . . conferred, as
against the Government, the right to be let alone . . . .” (emphasis added)).
50
See Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 456–57 (majority opinion).
51
Id. at 463–64, 466 (holding that listening to the suspect’s telephone calls was not an
unconstitutional search or seizure under the Fourth Amendment because listening to a telephone
conversation does not constitute a physical trespass). The Court may have reached this decision, at least
in part, because the case involved a suspected bootlegger and arose in the context of Prohibition
enforcement, id. at 455–56, thus placing political pressure on the Court to avoid removing tools from
law enforcement. See RICHARD F. HAMM, OLMSTEAD V. U@ITED STATES: THE CONSTITUTIONAL
CHALLENGES OF PROHIBITION ENFORCEMENT 1–2 (Fed. Jud. Ctr. ed. 2010), http://www.fjc.gov/public/
pdf.nsf/lookup/olmstead.pdf/$file/olmstead.pdf.
52
Carol M. Bast, What’s Bugging You? Inconsistencies and Irrationalities of the Law of
Eavesdropping, 47 DEPAUL L. REV. 837, 840 (1998) (“Private individuals and law enforcement officers,
at both the federal and the state levels, made extensive use of wiretapping and electronic surveillance
during the 1920s, 1930s, 1940s, 1950s, and most of the 1960s until Congress passed legislation
curtailing the practices in 1968.”).
53
See Scoular, supra note 45.
54
See, e.g., Stacy L. Mills, Note, He Wouldn’t Listen to Me Before, But @ow . . . : Interspousal
Wiretapping and an Analysis of State Wiretapping Statutes, 37 BRANDEIS L.J. 415, 415 & n.4 (1999)
(discussing the “alarming number” of instances of spousal wiretapping).
55
Bast, supra note 52, at 840–41.
56
See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967); Bast, supra note 52, at 841.
57
Katz v. United States, 369 F.2d 130, 131 (9th Cir. 1966).
58
Brief for the Respondent, Katz, 389 U.S. 347 (No. 35), 1967 WL 113606, at *3.
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entered into evidence at trial, where the judge convicted59 him of
“transmitting wagering information by telephone.”60 The Supreme Court
overturned Katz’s conviction61 and held that recording his conversations
violated the Fourth Amendment because Katz intended to keep them private
and had the constitutional right to do so.62 Justice Harlan’s concurrence
outlined what would become the two-part requirement guiding
constitutional protection of private conversations: (1) “a person [must] have
exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy” and (2) “the
expectation [must] be one that society is prepared to recognize as
‘reasonable.’”63
Congress codified Justice Harlan’s manifestation of protected private
conversations in Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets
Act of 1968,64 which requires law enforcement officials to either be a party
to a conversation or obtain the consent of either party before intercepting
private communications without a warrant.65 If neither consent nor a valid
warrant is obtained, any evidence extracted may be inadmissible in court,66
and the interception may subject the eavesdropper to criminal penalties and
civil damages.67 For “person[s] not acting under color of law,”68 however,
the Act permits recording with the consent of just one party to the
communication.69 These regulations were meant to “protect the ‘cherished
59

Katz, 369 F.2d at 131–32, 136. The district court conviction was rendered by a judge in a nonjury
trial. Brief for the Respondent, supra note 58, at *2.
60
Katz, 389 U.S. at 348.
61
Id. at 359.
62
Id. at 351–53.
63
Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
64
See Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, § 801, 82 Stat.
197, 211–14 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (2006)); see also Stephen Linzer, Federal Procedure for
Court Ordered Electronic Surveillance: Does It Meet the Standards of Berger and Katz?, 60 J. CRIM. L.
CRIMINOLOGY & POL. SCI. 203, 207 (1969) (“[The 1968 Act] represents a permissive scheme of court
ordered electronic surveillance while complying with the Supreme Court decisions in Berger and Katz.
It has two fundamental purposes: protecting the privacy of wire and oral communications and
delineating on a uniform basis the circumstances and conditions under which the interception of wire
and oral communications may be authorized.” (footnotes omitted)).
65
§ 2511(2)(c) (“It shall not be unlawful under this chapter for a person acting under color of law to
intercept a wire, oral, or electronic communication, where such person is a party to the communication
or one of the parties to the communication has given prior consent to such interception.”).
66
See id. § 2518(9)–(10).
67
Id. § 2511(4)(a).
68
Id. § 2511(2)(d) (emphasis added). “The term [color of law] usu[ally] implies a misuse of power
made possible because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of the state.” BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY 302 (9th ed. 2009); see also § 2510(7) (“‘Investigative or law enforcement officer’ means
any officer of the United States or of a State or political subdivision thereof, who is empowered by law
to conduct investigations of or to make arrests for offenses . . . .”).
69
Id. § 2511(2)(d) (“It shall not be unlawful . . . for a person not acting under color of law to
intercept a wire, oral, or electronic communication where such person is a party to the communication or
where one of the parties to the communication has given prior consent to such interception . . . .”).
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privacy of law-abiding citizens,’”70 and Congress felt this responsibility was
best left to the states.71 Therefore, the Act itself created a baseline of privacy
protection, leaving states to fill in the details and craft wiretapping laws to
suit their needs, provided those laws guarantee at least as much protection
as the federal statute72 and do not violate the Constitution.73
B. State Wiretapping Jurisprudence
Following the enactment of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act of 1968, most states passed statutes that permitted recording
under the consent of one party to the communication.74 In addition to
Maryland,75 where Anthony Graber was arrested, twelve states attempted to
expand this protection by requiring the consent of all parties to a
communication.76 Factors that help determine whether a party “consented”
to a recording include whether the recording is in “plain view” or
surreptitious,77 and whether the recorder is a party to the communication78 or

70

Skehill, supra note 5, at 990 n.73 (citing Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238, 250 n.9 (1979)).
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197, 197
(1968) (“[C]rime is essentially a local problem that must be dealt with by State and local governments if
it is to be controlled effectively.”).
72
Bast, supra note 52, at 845.
73
U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2 (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be
made in Pursuance thereof . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land . . . .”).
74
Jesse Harlan Alderman, Police Privacy in the iPhone Era? The @eed for Safeguards in State
Wiretapping Statutes to Preserve the Civilian’s Right to Record Public Police Activity, 9 FIRST AMEND.
L. REV. 487 app. at 535–39 (2011) (listing the thirty-four one-party-consent states).
75
MD. CODE. ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 10-401 to -403 (LexisNexis 2010).
76
See Alderman, supra note 74, at 496–510 (listing state statutes); Bast, supra note 52, at 927–30
(same). For the specific language of the statutes, see CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 631–632 (Deering 2010)
(California); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-187 to -189 (2010) (Connecticut); DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 11,
§§ 1335, 2401, 2402 (2010) (Delaware); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 934.02 to .03 (LexisNexis 2010) (Florida);
720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. §§ 5/14-1 to -2 (LexisNexis 2010) (Illinois); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 272,
§ 99 (LexisNexis 2010) (Massachusetts); MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. §§ 750.539, 750.539a to .539e
(LexisNexis 2010) (Michigan); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-8-213 (2010) (Montana); NEV. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 200.610, 200.650 (LexisNexis 2010) (Nevada); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 570-A:2 (LexisNexis
2010) (New Hampshire); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 133.721, 133.726, 165.540, 165.542 to .543 (2010)
(Oregon); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 5701–5704 (2010) (Pennsylvania); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 9.73.030 (LexisNexis 2010) (Washington).
77
See, e.g., Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78, 86–88 (2d Cir. 2011); Kelly v. Borough of Carlisle, 622
F.3d 248, 256, 259 n.7 (3d Cir. 2010); Skehill, supra 5, at 983–84 & n.23; Howard M. Wasserman,
Orwell’s Vision: Video and the Future of Civil Rights Enforcement, 68 MD. L. REV. 600, 649–51 (2009).
In Massachusetts, for example, consent is implied if the other party can see the recording device. See,
e.g., Commonwealth v. Hyde, 750 N.E.2d 963, 969 (Mass. 2001) (“The defendant was not prosecuted
for making the recording; he was prosecuted for doing so secretly.”); id. at 971; Commonwealth v. Glik,
No. 0701-CR-6687, at 2 (Bos. Mun. Ct. Jan. 31, 2008), available at http://www.volokh.com/
files/glik.pdf.
78
See infra text accompanying note 89.
71
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a third-party observer.79 All-party consent statutes can be further broken
down into two categories: (1) statutes that require a reasonable expectation
of privacy in the communication to prohibit recording80 and (2) statutes that
prohibit recording regardless of whether the parties had a reasonable
expectation of privacy.81
All-party consent statutes permit—but do not require82—arrest and
prosecution even if unconsented recording is an individual’s only offense.83
However, the purpose of all-party consent statutes is to prevent
“unwarranted spying and intrusions on people’s privacy,”84 not give the
police an avenue to suppress protected speech; using these statutes to arrest
and prosecute citizens recording police conduct represents their
fundamental misuse. All-party consent statutes have also led to other
unintended consequences.85 For example, for a citizen to protect himself
from a would-be blackmailer, he would first need to obtain the would-be
blackmailer’s consent before recording proof of her crime, otherwise the
citizen would also be guilty of a felony.86
These all-party consent statutes also contain a logical flaw because
both parties to a communication always consent to its capture and storage:
79

CATO Video, supra note 22 (statement of Joseph I. Cassilly, State’s Attorney, Harford County,
Maryland).
80
E.g., MD. CODE. ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. §§ 10-401 to -403 (LexisNexis 2010); 18 PA. CONS.
STAT. §§ 5701–5704 (2010); see also Alderman, supra note 74, at 496–500.
81
E.g., 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. §§ 5/14-1 to -2 (LexisNexis 2010); see also Alderman, supra
note 74, at 496, 500–06.
82
Police and prosecutors have nearly limitless, unreviewable discretion in choosing whether to
arrest or charge someone with a crime. See, e.g., AMY BACH, ORDINARY INJUSTICE: HOW AMERICA
HOLDS COURT 130 (2009) (“By law and custom, a prosecutor has broad authority in prosecuting
criminal cases, including the option to “screen out” or decide against pursuing a case at any
stage. . . . For the most part, th[is] exercise of ‘prosecutorial discretion’ requires no formal process or
oversight.”); Joseph Goldstein, Police Discretion @ot to Invoke the Criminal Process: Low-Visibility
Decisions in the Administration of Justice, 69 YALE L.J. 543, 543 (1960) (stating that police officers
may choose not to invoke the criminal process against an individual); Peter Krug, Prosecutorial
Discretion and Its Limits, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 643, 645 (2002) (same).
83
MD. CODE. ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 10-402(b) (LexisNexis 2010) (“Any person who violates
[§ 10-402(a), the wiretapping prohibition] is guilty of a felony and is subject to imprisonment for not
more than 5 years or a fine of not more than $ 10,000, or both.”).
84
Marianne B. Davis & Laurie R. Bortz, Legislation, The 1977 Maryland Wiretapping and
Electronic Surveillance Act, 7 U. BALT. L. REV. 374, 384 (1978) (quoting 1973 Md. Laws 1924–25
(statement of Governor Marvin Mandel)).
85
Many well-intentioned laws create unintended consequences. See, e.g., Karen Turnage Boyd, The
Tale of Two Systems: How Integrated Divorce Laws Can Remedy the Unintended Effects of Pure @oFault Divorce, 12 CARDOZO J. L. & GENDER 609, 622–24 (2006) (discussing the unintended
consequences of no-fault divorce laws); Christopher Dinkel, Note, Welfare Family Caps and the ZeroGrant Situation, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 365, 367–68 (2011) (arguing that welfare laws in California have
unintentionally prevented otherwise deserving families from receiving much-needed financial
assistance).
86
See CATO Video, supra note 22, at 22:34 (statement of Joseph I. Cassilly, State’s Attorney,
Harford County, Maryland).
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when a person chooses to communicate with someone else, they are
implicitly consenting to the other party receiving the information to
reference and share at a later point.87 Any time a person communicates
information to someone else, he risks having that information repeated;88
that risk of disclosure is not necessarily greater when the person is using a
recording device. Thus, “sousveillance,” which is “the recording of an
activity by a participant in the activity,”89 always has the implicit consent of
all parties.90
In some states, all-party consent is required only if the parties have a
reasonable expectation of privacy.91 The rationale for this requirement is
that harm is less likely to occur if the conduct or communication captured
was never intended to be private.92 Police officers acting within their official
capacity are generally afforded a diminished expectation of privacy.93 This
is especially true when the underlying actions involve depriving citizens of
their freedom. As then-Associate Justice Rehnquist put it:
An arrest is not a “private” event. An encounter between law enforcement
authorities and a citizen is ordinarily a matter of public record, and by the very
87

See id. at 1:06:40 (statement of Joseph I. Cassilly, State’s Attorney, Harford County, Maryland).
In the immortal words of Benjamin Franklin: “Three may keep a secret, if two of them are dead.”
TRYON EDWARDS, A DICTIONARY OF THOUGHTS 508 (N.Y., Cassell Publ’g Co. 1891).
89
Goldsmith, supra note 33, at 922 (internal quotation marks omitted).
90
This remains true even if the sharing party does not know she is being recorded because she is
still communicating something to another person at the risk of having that person disclose that
communication. Logically, this risk does not decrease just because the communicator does not know if
the receiver is actively “remembering” the encounter.
91
For example, Pennsylvania requires the consent of both parties for a person not affiliated with
law enforcement to record a communication. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5704(4) (2010) (providing an
exception to the all-party consent rule by permitting “[a] person, to intercept a wire, electronic or oral
communication, where all parties to the communication have given prior consent to such interception”).
The statute defines “oral communication” as “[a]ny oral communication uttered by a person possessing
an expectation that such communication is not subject to interception under circumstances justifying
such expectation.” Id. § 5702. However, not all Pennsylvania legislators agree with these definitions,
and on April 21, 2009, House Bill 1308 was introduced in the Pennsylvania House of Representatives,
suggesting the following changes to section 5704(4):
A person, to intercept a wire, electronic or oral communication, where . . . the person is a party to
the communication or where one of the parties to the communication has given prior consent to
the interception unless the communication is intercepted for the purpose of committing any
criminal or tortious act.
H.R. 1308, 193d Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2009) (emphasis in original indicates the proposed
language change). If passed, this bill would have made Pennsylvania a one-party consent state; instead,
it died after being introduced to the judiciary committee. Bill Information, Regular Session 2009–2010,
House Bill 1308, PA. GEN. ASSEMBLY, http://www.legis.state.pa.us/cfdocs/billinfo/bill_history.cfm?
syear=2009&sind=0&body=H&type=B&bn=1308 (last visited Mar. 18, 2012).
92
See State v. Forrester, 587 P.2d 179, 184 (Wash. Ct. App. 1978) (“To determine whether or not
a . . . conversation is private [for the purposes of Washington’s all-party consent wiretapping prohibition
that requires a reasonable expectation of privacy], the court must consider the intent or reasonable
expectations of the participants as manifested by the facts and circumstances of each case.”).
93
See Wasserman, supra note 77, at 650.
88
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definition of the term it involves an intrusion into a person’s bodily integrity.
To speak of an arrest as a private occurrence seems to me to stretch even the
broadest definitions of the idea of privacy beyond the breaking point.94

This is not to say that police officers never have an expectation for privacy
when engaging with the public, but rather that privacy is the exception, not
the rule.95
II. THE RIGHT TO RECORD THE POLICE IS “CLEARLY ESTABLISHED”
A. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Qualified Immunity Defense
A lawsuit brought against a police officer or municipality under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 is the forum in which the First Amendment right to record
the police is most likely to be considered by courts.96 Section 1983 provides
a civil remedy for individuals whose constitutional rights have been
violated by a person acting under color of law:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the
United States . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . . .97

The individuals being sued—usually government officials such as police
officers—are entitled to an affirmative defense under the doctrine of
qualified immunity.98 Immunity will only be granted if properly invoked
94
William H. Rehnquist, Is an Expanded Right of Privacy Consistent with Fair and Effective Law
Enforcement?, 23 U. KAN. L. REV. 1, 8 (1974).
95
Dina Mishra, Comment, Undermining Excessive Privacy for Police: Citizen Tape Recording to
Check Police Officers’ Power, 117 YALE L.J. 1549, 1555 (2008). Police officers can create an
expectation of privacy that rightfully should protect the contents of their communications by
“exercis[ing] some control to protect sensitive investigative or personal information against citizen
recording by ensuring that they communicate about such information only in their own private spaces, or
at least out of citizens’ apparent earshot.” Id. at 1556. However, these steps should not be able to shield
an officer who wishes to verbally or physically assault a suspect because this might encourage more
active efforts to conceal misconduct.
96
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006). First Amendment claims can, of course, arise in other contexts. See,
e.g., Jean v. Mass. State Police, 492 F.3d 24, 30 (1st Cir. 2007) (permitting dissemination of an Internet
posting of police conduct after a plaintiff successfully challenged police interference under the
Massachusetts interception statute); ACLU v. Alvarez, No. 10-C-5235, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2088
(N.D. Ill. Jan. 10, 2011) (seeking injunctive relief against Illinois’s eavesdropping statute);
Commonwealth v. Hyde, 750 N.E.2d 963 (Mass. 2001) (challenging the use of a Massachusetts
wiretapping statute to prosecute a criminal defendant for recording the police).
97
§ 1983.
98
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815 (1982) (“Qualified or ‘good faith’ immunity is an
affirmative defense that must be pleaded by a defendant official.”); see also BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY
818 (9th ed. 2009) (defining “qualified immunity” as “[i]mmunity from civil liability for a public
official who is performing a discretionary function, as long as the conduct does not violate clearly
established constitutional or statutory rights”). Qualified immunity is justified because it mitigates the
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and if the actor’s “conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”99
Thus, courts can dismiss a case on qualified immunity grounds if: (1) a
constitutional right was not violated or (2) the right was not clearly
established.100
In 2001, the Supreme Court’s decision in Saucier v. Katz required
courts to first consider the constitutional element, and only if a party
establishes that a constitutional right was violated were courts to consider
“whether the right was clearly established.”101 However, the Court quickly
became convinced that the Saucier sequence was an unworkable and
unwise approach.102 In Pearson v. Callahan, the Court dramatically shifted
the way in which courts may analyze the qualified immunity defense.103
Pearson allows courts to use their “sound discretion” when choosing the
order in which the qualified immunity factors are considered.104 For citizen
recorders of police conduct, the outcome was not good. After Pearson,
federal courts became more likely to declare that the right to record police
conduct has not been clearly established than they were to engage in a
constitutional analysis.105
The precise meaning of “clearly established” is hazy.106 The Court has
stated that a clearly established right must be “sufficiently clear” and

fear of lawsuits that might otherwise chill or inhibit lawful and necessary actions by state officials. See
JAMES E. PFANDER, PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL JURISDICTION 227 (2d ed. 2011).
99
Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (quoting Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
100
See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818.
101
533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). This ordering was important because questions of qualified immunity
under § 1983 claims may be the only avenue in which a constitutional question could be brought before
a court. See Sarah Lynn Lochner, Note, Qualified Immunity, Constitutional Stagnation, and the Global
War on Terror, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 829, 832 (2011) (arguing that constitutional rights for individuals
being prosecuted or detained as part of the “Global War on Terror” are most readily developed by courts
under the qualified immunity analysis that follows the Saucier sequence).
102
John C. Jeffries, Jr., Reversing the Order of Battle in Constitutional Torts, 2009 SUP. CT. REV.
115, 115–16 & nn.4–5 (citing cases that discuss the burden that “unnecessary merits adjudications” can
place on courts).
103
555 U.S. at 223.
104
Id. at 236.
105
See, e.g., Kelly v. Borough of Carlisle, 622 F.3d 248, 262 (3d Cir. 2010); Szymecki v. Houck,
353 F. App’x 852, 853 (4th Cir. 2009); Adkins v. Guam Police Dep’t, No. 09-00029, 2010 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 87353, at *28–36 (D. Guam Aug. 24, 2010); Banks v. Gallagher, No. 3:08-1110, 2010 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 55308, at *35–36 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 18, 2010); Matheny v. Cnty. of Allegheny, No. 09-1070, 2010
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24189, at *12 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 16, 2010); Gravolet v. Tassin, No. 08-3646, 2009 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 45876, at *12–13 (E.D. La. June 2, 2009). The recently decided exception is Glik v.
Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78, 82 (1st Cir. 2011).
106
Eastwood v. Dep’t of Corr., 846 F.2d 627, 630 (10th Cir. 1988) (“Definitions of what constitutes
a clearly established right have been hazy.”); Charles R. Wilson, “Location, Location, Location”:
Recent Developments in the Qualified Immunity Defense, 57 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 445, 447–48
(2000) (“Determining exactly when a right is ‘clearly established’ for qualified immunity purposes is
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“apparent” such that a reasonable official would know that his actions
violated a protected right.107 This knowledge can be inferred if the official
had “fair warning” that his actions violated a person’s constitutional
rights.108 One way to demonstrate fair warning is to show that a “robust
consensus of cases of persuasive authority”109 delineates the right “beyond
debate.”110 Although the Court has failed to suggest a metric for determining
what constitutes a “robust consensus,”111 it has stated that the absence of
“materially similar” precedent does not preclude a finding that a right was
clearly established.112 Therefore courts may look outside intracircuit and
Supreme Court caselaw to make that finding, just as the Supreme Court
itself has done.113 Despite the latitude that courts enjoy in deciding whether
a right is clearly established, nearly every federal court that has decided the
issue since Pearson has foregone constitutional analysis in favor of holding
that the right to record police has not been clearly established.114 This is
unsurprising given that weighing the rights and needs of citizens against
those of the police is an unenviable task that anyone would justifiably want
to avoid.115
philosophically complex. . . . [And,] there is remarkably little consensus among the United States circuit
courts concerning how to interpret the term . . . .”).
107
Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987).
108
Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739–41 (2002).
109
Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2084 (2011) (quoting Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 617
(1999)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
110
Id. at 2083. Justice Scalia’s phrase “beyond debate” is a disappointingly unhelpful contribution
to the development of the definition of “clearly established.” Failing to provide a metric for making such
a determination changes the actual words that courts will use in their rulings without affecting the
outcomes they will ultimately reach or the means by which they arrive at these decisions. More helpful
would have been examples of what, if anything, places critical constitutional issues beyond debate.
111
The First Circuit has suggested that “two closely related” cases may be sufficient to find that a
right is clearly established. Wilson v. City of Boston, 421 F.3d 45, 57 (1st Cir. 2005).
112
Hope, 536 U.S. at 739.
113
Id. at 741–42 (looking to an Alabama Department of Corrections regulation and a Department of
Justice report, in addition to binding precedent, to determine that conduct violated a “clearly
established” constitutional right); see also Willingham v. Loughnan, 321 F.3d 1299, 1301 (11th Cir.
2003) (“General statements of the law contained within the Constitution, statute, or caselaw may
sometimes provide ‘fair warning’ of unlawful conduct.” (quoting Hope, 536 U.S. at 741)). But see
Adkins v. Guam Police Dep’t, No. 09-00029, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87353, at *36 (D. Guam Aug. 24,
2010) (“If the only way to find there is a clearly established right is to look to other circuits for guidance
then it is likely that the right is not, in fact, clearly established in this circuit.”).
114
See supra note 105 (citing opinions by federal courts that have decided the issue). The recent
First Circuit case Glik v. Cunniffe is an encouraging exception. See 655 F.3d 78, 84–85 (1st Cir. 2011).
115
See Camreta v. Greene, 131 S. Ct. 2020, 2031 (2011) (“In this category of qualified immunity
cases, a court can enter judgment without ever ruling on the (perhaps difficult) constitutional claim the
plaintiff has raised. Small wonder, then, that a court might leave that issue for another day.”); Wilson,
supra note 106, at 447 (“Judges in qualified immunity matters frequently face a series of unappealing
moral choices, ranging from subjecting a public servant to personal liability for conduct undertaken in
good faith, to eliminating a potential remedy for a plaintiff who has been subjected to embarrassing and
degrading conduct.”).
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Unfortunately, courts that use their Pearson discretion to avoid
determining whether a constitutional right exists and then declare that a
right is not clearly established can do so ad infinitum. This leads to the
undesirable consequence that a right might never be “established”:
Officer A contends that the right to videotape police is not clearly established
and the judge, without deciding if there is such a right, agrees that the law in
that regard is not clearly established and that Officer A is entitled to qualified
immunity. Case dismissed. A year later, when you sue Officer B, the judge
looks at her earlier opinion and sees that the law is no clearer now than it was a
year ago. Case dismissed. And when you sue Officer C the law is no clearer
than it was in the previous two cases. Case dismissed. And so on.116

No standard is articulated and individuals seeking to record police conduct
are consequently deprived of a framework for determining the limits, if any,
of their right to do so.117 However, indefinite lack of clarity is not a foregone
conclusion118 because considerable evidence supports the notion that the
right to record police conduct—a derivative of the right to observe and
report on police conduct and misconduct—has been clearly established.
B. Current Circuit Split
Both the First and Third Circuits have recently ruled on whether the
right to record the police is clearly established, each reaching a different
conclusion: in Glik v. Cunniffe, the First Circuit found the right clearly
established;119 in Kelly v. Borough of Carlisle, the Third Circuit found that it
was not.120
1. The First Circuit: Glik v. Cunniffe.—On October 1, 2007, Simon
Glik noticed three Boston Police officers arresting a man near Boston
Common.121 When he overheard another bystander say, “You are hurting
116
Mary Catherine Roper, 3rd Circuit Police Videotaping Case Leaves Uncertainty in Its Wake,
LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Oct. 25, 2010, at 7, 7–8.
117
E.g., Camreta, 131 S. Ct. at 2030–31 (explaining that, by failing to address novel issues and
claims, courts fail to encourage law-abiding behavior in public officials); Jeffries, supra note 102, at 120
(“Without merits adjudication, the legal rule would remain unclear, and development of the law would
be forestalled by repeated applications of qualified immunity.”); Roper, supra note 116, at 8 (“If the
judge never addresses the first step in the Saucier analysis, then the law remains ambiguous and your
clients remain without protection.”).
118
The recent Supreme Court ruling in Camreta v. Greene supports this claim. In Camreta, the
Court held that the party that wins a qualified immunity defense may still appeal a victory to clarify the
constitutionality of the challenged actions. 131 S. Ct. at 2030–32. This will have the effect of
“establishing controlling law” and “promot[ing] clarity—and observance—of constitutional rules.” Id. at
2030. If lower courts know that a ruling on the constitutionality of a government actor’s conduct can be
appealed, they might be more likely to engage in at least a minimal explication of constitutional
standards, thereby making courts more likely to decide, rather than avoid, constitutional issues.
119
655 F.3d 78, 82 (1st Cir. 2011).
120
622 F.3d 248, 262 (3d Cir. 2010).
121
Glik, 655 F.3d at 79.
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him, stop,” he realized the officers might be using excessive force and
began recording the arrest with his cell phone.122 As Glik recorded the arrest
from a distance of approximately ten feet, one of the officers said, “I think
you have taken enough pictures,” to which Glik replied, “I am recording
this. I saw you punch him.”123 After this exchange, one of the officers asked
Glik if his cell phone was recording audio, and when Glik confirmed that it
was, he was placed under arrest for violating Massachusetts’s all-party
consent wiretapping statute.124 Glik’s criminal charges for violating the
wiretapping statute were dismissed by the Boston Municipal Court because
he made no effort to conceal the fact that he was recording the police and
therefore did not meet the element of the offense requiring that the
recording be intentionally secretive.125
As is its prerogative in qualified immunity analysis, the First Circuit
chose first to determine whether a First Amendment right to record the
police exists. Drawing on longstanding Supreme Court precedent, the First
Circuit held that the First Amendment proscribes laws that abridge an
individual’s rights to free speech, a free press, and a “range of conduct
related to the gathering and dissemination of information.”126 The court
specifically noted that the right to gather and disseminate information
applies to the media and nearby citizens with cell phone and video cameras
alike, particularly when that information is of public importance or relates
to the duties of public officials.127 This right is not unlimited, however, and
is subject to content-neutral time, place, and manner restrictions.128
Upon finding that the right exists, the First Circuit then found that it
was clearly established because its ruling in Iacobucci v. Boulter, decided
nearly a decade before Glik’s arrest,129 “recognized a right to film
government officials or matters of public interest in public space.”130 The
First Circuit concluded that Iacobucci, in conjunction with several
extracircuit cases, led squarely to the conclusion that “a citizen’s right to
122

Id. at 79–80. Glik is now a practicing attorney in Boston, Massachusetts, having graduated from
New England Law School in 2006. Simon Glik, About Me, GLIKLAW, http://gliklaw.com/gliklaw/
About_Me.html (last visited Mar. 18, 2012).
123
Glik, 655 F.3d at 80 (internal quotation marks omitted).
124
Id. (citing MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272, § 99(C)(1) (2011) (prohibiting secretly recording
another’s conversation)); see also § 99(B)(4) (“The term ‘interception’ means to secretly hear, secretly
record, or aid another to secretly hear or secretly record the contents of any wire or oral communication
through the use of any intercepting device by any person other than a person given prior authority by all
parties to such communication.” (emphases added)).
125
Glik, 655 F.3d at 80.
126
Id. at 82.
127
Id. at 84 (citing Iacobucci v. Boulter, 193 F.3d 14, 25 (1st Cir. 1999)).
128
Id. (citing Smith v. City of Cumming, 212 F.3d 1332, 1333 (11th Cir. 2000)). Smith is discussed
in more detail infra Part II.C.1.
129
193 F.3d at 14.
130
Glik, 655 F.3d at 84–85.
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film government officials, including law enforcement officers, in the
discharge of their duties in a public space is a basic, vital, and wellestablished liberty safeguarded by the First Amendment.”131 The court
reached this conclusion despite noting that the Third Circuit came to the
opposite one in Kelly v. Borough of Carlisle.132 The First Circuit supported
its holding by distinguishing the facts and context of Simon Glik’s case.133
But even in the absence of these slightly divergent facts, Kelly is
unpersuasive because of internal inconsistencies and analytical
shortcomings.
2. The Third Circuit: Kelly v. Borough of Carlisle.—In Kelly,
Officer David Rogers stopped Tyler Shopp for speeding and a bumperheight violation.134 The plaintiff, Brian Kelly, was Shopp’s passenger and
had with him a small video camera that he used to record the incident.135
Toward the end of the encounter, Officer Rogers informed the boys that he
was recording their conversation, at which point he discovered that Kelly
was also recording their interaction.136 Believing this to be a violation of
Pennsylvania’s wiretapping law, Officer Rogers ordered Kelly to turn over
the camera,137 evidently failing to appreciate the “do as I say, not as I do”
double standard of the command. After Kelly complied, Officer Rogers
returned to his patrol car, called an Assistant District Attorney to confirm
that Kelly’s behavior had violated the wiretapping statute, and arrested and
detained the teenager for twenty-seven hours.138
When the charges against him were eventually dropped,139 Kelly filed a
claim against Officer Rogers and the Borough of Carlisle under § 1983 for
violating his First Amendment right to record the police.140 Officer Rogers
and the Borough of Carlisle successfully invoked a qualified immunity
defense at trial, where the judge held that the right to record the police had
not been clearly established.141 In affirming the lower court’s ruling, the
131

Id. at 85 (citing Smith, 212 F.3d at 1333; Fordyce v. City of Seattle, 55 F.3d 436, 439 (9th Cir.

1995)).
132

622 F.3d 248, 262 (3d Cir. 2010).
Glik, 655 F.3d at 85.
134
622 F.3d at 251.
135
Id.
136
Id.
137
Id. (citing Pennsylvania Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance Control Act, 18 PA. CONS.
STAT. §§ 5701–5782 (2010)).
138
Id. at 251–52.
139
Id. at 252; see also Miller, supra note 28 (“[Cumberland County District Attorney David] Freed
said he withdrew the charge after reviewing evidence in the case and state court rulings regarding
application of the wiretap law.”).
140
Kelly, 622 F.3d at 252 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006)). Kelly also sued for violation of his
Fourth Amendment rights. Id. at 252, 254.
141
Id. at 252–53 (“The [district] [c]ourt reasoned that . . . it was unclear whether Kelly had a right
to videotape the police stop . . . .”).
133
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Third Circuit reasoned that: (1) the right to record the police had only been
“hypothesized” by courts in the past,142 (2) cases that support a “general
right to record matters of public concern” were “insufficiently analogous”143
to Kelly’s case, and (3) the three on-point cases it cited were numerically
insufficient to clearly establish the right.144
Although the Kelly court’s analysis of the “clearly established” prong
of the qualified immunity defense appears doctrinally plausible, it is
incomplete for two reasons. First, it cited and then overlooked both Third
Circuit precedent that calls for a low threshold for concluding that a right is
clearly established, as well as Supreme Court precedent that allows the
“clearly established” prong to be satisfied in cases lacking the “exact” same
set of facts. Second, it largely ignored the context of the issue given the
facts of Brian Kelly’s case, such as evidence that Officer Rogers actually
did know of a citizen’s right to record police conduct.
The Kelly court cited the low threshold for finding a right clearly
established in the Third Circuit’s opinion in Kopec v. Tate,145 and concluded
that such a finding could be based solely on the “case law of other
circuits.”146 It added that, “[alt]hough we have not [yet] had occasion to
decide this [specific] issue, several other courts have addressed the right to
record police while they perform their duties.”147 The court then cited three
cases—one from the Third Circuit,148 one from a district court in
Pennsylvania,149 and another from the Eleventh Circuit150—that support a
citizen’s right to record police conduct.151 However, and without adequate

142

Id. at 260 (quoting Gilles v. Davis, 427 F.3d 197, 212 n.14 (3rd Cir. 2005)).
Id. at 261–62.
144
See id. at 262.
145
361 F.3d 772, 778 (3d Cir. 2004) (“[I]t cannot be said as a matter of law that a reasonable officer
would not have known that his conduct was in violation of [a constitutional right] even though it appears
that neither the Supreme Court nor [the Third Circuit] has ruled [on the issue].”).
146
Kelly, 622 F.3d at 260; see also RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND
REFORM 376 (1996) (“The tendency in the courts of appeals is to treat Supreme Court decisions and
decisions of the same circuit as authoritative and to interpret them broadly, but to treat decisions of other
circuits as no more than persuasive and to interpret them narrowly. I am not sure how sensible this
pattern is.”).
147
Kelly, 622 F.3d at 260.
148
Id. (“[V]ideotaping or photographing the police in the performance of their duties on public
property may be a protected activity.” (emphasis omitted) (quoting Gilles v. Davis, 427 F.3d 197, 212
n.14 (3d Cir. 2005)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
149
Id. at 260–61 (“[T]here is a free speech right to film police officers in the performance of their
public duties.” (citing Robinson v. Fetterman, 378 F. Supp. 2d 534, 541 (E.D. Pa. 2005))).
150
Id. at 260 (“[There is] a ‘First Amendment right, subject to reasonable time, manner and place
restrictions, to photograph or videotape police conduct’ . . . . ‘[T]he First Amendment protects the right
to gather information about what public officials do on public property, and specifically, a right to
record matters of public interest.’” (quoting Smith v. City of Cumming, 212 F.3d 1332, 1332–33 (11th
Cir. 2000))).
151
Id. at 260–61.
143
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explanation, the court then concluded that these three cases were
“insufficient” to “put a reasonably competent officer on ‘fair notice’ that
seizing a camera or arresting an individual for videotaping police during [a
traffic] stop would violate the First Amendment.”152
Kelly also favorably cited the Supreme Court’s decision in Hope v.
Pelzer for the proposition that it is “not necessary” for the “exact set” of
factual circumstances at issue to have been previously analyzed to find that
a right is clearly established.153 However, Kelly ultimately refused to follow
the aforementioned caselaw that supports the “proposition that a general
right to record matters of public concern has been clearly established”154
precisely because it was factually distinct from Brian Kelly’s case.155 All
told, the Kelly court referenced a total of eight cases156 that supported the
right to record public officials, three of which expressly supported that right

152
Id. at 262. But see infra note 159 and accompanying text (discussing a case from the District of
New Jersey cited in Kelly as an example of doctrinal ambiguity).
153
Kelly, 622 F.3d at 259 (quoting Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739 (2002)).
154
Id. at 261.
155
Id. at 262 (“We find these cases insufficiently analogous to the facts of this case to have put
Officer Rogers on notice of a clearly established right to videotape police officers during a traffic
stop.”). To emphasize the uniqueness of the facts, the court emphasized that “none of the precedents
upon which Kelly relies involved traffic stops.” Id. at 262. This statement adds little to the analysis and
is also factually incorrect. In Smith v. City of Cumming, the Eleventh Circuit explicitly held that citizens
have a First Amendment right to record the police. 212 F.3d at 1332–33. Although not mentioned in the
text of the opinion, a cursory examination of the briefs indicates the issue actually did arise in the
context of traffic stops. Brief of Appellant at 2, 11–12, Smith, 212 F.3d at 1332 (No. 99-8199-J); see
also infra Part II.C.1 (discussing Smith in greater detail). In an effort to diminish Smith’s persuasive
value, the Kelly court noted that, “[i]n the decade since [Smith] was decided, our decision in Gilles is the
only federal appeals court case to cite it.” Kelly, 622 F.3d at 260 (citing Gilles v. Davis, 427 F.3d 197,
212 n.14 (3d Cir. 2005)). This assertion, while correct, more likely reflects the fact that no court, circuit
court of appeals or otherwise, considered whether individuals have a First Amendment right to record
the police from 2000 until 2005. On July 19, 2005, a district court in the Third Circuit unequivocally
held that the right exists. Robinson v. Fetterman, 378 F. Supp. 2d 534, 542 (E.D. Pa. 2005). Just three
months later, in Gilles v. Davis, the Third Circuit stated that the right “may” exist. 427 F.3d at 212 n.14.
Both cases cited Smith. Id.; Robinson, 378 F. Supp. 2d at 541. The only other circuit courts to discuss
citizens recording police conduct before Gilles did not analyze whether the right to do so exists under
the First Amendment or whether that right was clearly established. See Johnson v. Hawe, 388 F.3d 676,
679 (9th Cir. 2004) (determining whether recording a police officer in the conduct of his official duties
violated Washington’s Privacy Act); cf. Walker v. City of Pine Bluff, 414 F.3d 989, 991–93 (8th Cir.
2005) (analyzing a citizen’s right to observe the police performing their duties and considering whether
an officer has “arguable probable cause to arrest [an individual] for obstructing governmental operations
because [that individual] distracted officers who were conducting a traffic stop by silently watching the
encounter from across the street with his arms folded in a disapproving manner.”).
156
In order of reference by the Kelly court, the cases are: (1) Gilles, 427 F.3d at 212 n.14; (2) Smith,
212 F.3d at 1332–33; (3) Robinson, 378 F. Supp. 2d at 541; (4) Fordyce v. City of Seattle, 55 F.3d 436,
439 (9th Cir. 1995); (5) Blackston v. Alabama, 30 F.3d 117, 120 (11th Cir. 1994); (6) Demarest v.
Athol/Orange Community Television, Inc., 188 F. Supp. 2d 82, 94 (D. Mass. 2002); (7) Thompson v.
City of Clio, 765 F. Supp. 1066, 1070 (M.D. Ala. 1991); and (8) Lambert v. Polk County, 723 F. Supp.
128, 133–35 (S.D. Iowa 1989). See 622 F.3d at 260–63.
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with regard to police officers.157 This is twice as many cases as the Third
Circuit needed to find a right clearly established in Kopec.158 In fact, the
Kelly court did not identify a single case that denied the existence of the
right to record the police or other public officials,159 even though denying
citizens the right to record police conduct is the practical outcome of its
ruling.160 Nor could the Kelly court draw on any additional post-Pearson161
cases from the Third Circuit that analyzed the constitutional merits of the
right because those cases uniformly held that the right was not “clearly
established.”162 Therefore, Kelly, the third court in the Third Circuit to
conclude that the right to record the police was not “clearly established,”
appears to bear out Saucier’s unsettling prediction that “[t]he law might be
deprived of [an] explanation were a court simply to skip ahead to the

157

See id. at 260–61.
The court in Kopec cites Third Circuit precedent to establish the principle that “[t]his court has
adopted a broad view of what constitutes an established right of which a reasonable person would have
known.” 361 F.3d 772, 778 (3d Cir. 2004) (alteration in original) (quoting Burns v. Cnty. of Cambria,
971 F.2d 1015, 1024 (3d Cir. 1992)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Kopec court then used this
principle to declare a right clearly established by using three factually distinct cases, all from courts
outside the Third Circuit. Id. (citing Martin v. Heideman, 106 F.3d 1308, 1312 (6th Cir. 1997);
Alexander v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 64 F.3d 1315, 1322–23 (9th Cir. 1995); Palmer v. Sanderson, 9 F.3d
1433, 1436 (9th Cir. 1993)). In fact, Kopec only cites to the Third Circuit to justify its use of persuasive
precedent from other circuits. Id. This makes it peculiar that Kelly fails to do the same with precedent
that is more factually and geographically analogous.
159
The court cited Pomykacz v. West Wildwood as an example of a court that “declined to adopt
[the] blanket assertion that ‘the observation and monitoring of public officials is protected by the [F]irst
[A]mendment.’” Kelly, 622 F.3d at 261 (alterations in original) (emphasis added) (quoting Pomykacz v.
W. Wildwood, 438 F. Supp. 2d 504, 512–13 & n.14 (D.N.J. 2006)). However, stating that an alternative
argument can be made without adopting one side or the other is not an affirmative denial of that
argument. Moreover, the Kelly court ignored a case from a Pennsylvania district court that supports the
conclusion that the public has a right to record the police in a public place. See McKenna v. City of
Philadelphia, No. 07-CV-110, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76766, at *11, 32–34 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 30, 2008),
aff’d, 582 F.3d 447 (3d Cir. 2009) (“At the plaintiffs’ request (and over the objection of the City), I gave
[a jury] instruction in this case that videotaping [the police] in a public place was a protected activity,
but I declined to extend that right to the secured area of the police district.”). It also failed to mention
extra-district cases that reach the opposite conclusion of Pomykacz. See Am. Steel Erectors, Inc. v. Local
Union No. 7, Int’l Ass’n of Bridge Workers, No. 04-12536, 2006 WL 300422, at *4 n.6 (D. Mass.
2006), aff’d, 536 F.3d 68 (1st Cir. 2008) (“Videotaping of public activity for the purposes of petitioning
governmental authorities would seem to be activity protected by the First Amendment.”).
160
See Camreta v. Greene, 131 S. Ct. 2020, 2031 (2011) (arguing that the absence of constitutional
decisions will likely cause officials to “persist[] in [the] challenged practice” because the official “knows
that he can avoid liability” in the future by means of granted qualified immunity because the law “still”
remains not clearly established).
161
In Robinson v. Fetterman, the district court concluded that the right to record the police exists,
378 F. Supp. 2d at 534, but the case was decided before Pearson gave courts discretion to choose the
order in which they engage in qualified immunity analysis, 555 U.S. 223 (2009).
162
Banks v. Gallagher, No. 3:08-1110, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55308, at *35–36 (M.D. Pa. Mar.
18, 2010); Matheny v. Cnty. of Allegheny, No. 09-1070, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24189, at *12 (W.D.
Pa. Mar. 16, 2010).
158
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question whether the law clearly established that the officer’s conduct was
unlawful in the circumstances of the case.”163
The Kelly court should have also considered the above precedent164 in
light of the specific context of Brian Kelly’s case. The Supreme Court has
stated that the “specific context” of a case’s facts is relevant in determining
whether a right was clearly established at the time the government official
acted,165 and that the police officers “can still be on notice that their conduct
violates established law even in novel factual circumstances” as long as the
defendant had “‘fair warning’ that his conduct was unconstitutional.”166 In
Kelly, Officer Rogers almost certainly had “fair warning” of these court
decisions at the time of Kelly’s arrest. This is because the Borough of
Carlisle’s police department has a “very vigorous training program”167 that,
in 2007, included a required “Legal Updates”168 course that covered “legal
issues affecting municipal police officers,” such as “United States Supreme
Court opinions and Pennsylvania court decisions regarding Search and
Seizure as well as other pertinent case law.”169 Decisions establishing the
right to record police conduct had been on the books in Pennsylvania for
two years prior to the incident in Kelly.170 Moreover, the Manheim
Township Police Department in nearby Lancaster, Pennsylvania had an
official policy of “recogniz[ing] the legal standing of members of the public
to make video/audio recordings of police officers” since December 2007 at
the latest.171 Although published after Kelly’s arrest, it is unreasonable to
163

Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001).
See supra notes 148–50 and accompanying text.
165
Id. (stating that the inquiry into whether a right was clearly established for the purposes of a
qualified immunity defense “must be undertaken in light of the specific context of the case, not as a
broad general proposition” (emphasis added)).
166
Kelly v. Borough of Carlisle, 622 F.3d 248, 259–60 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Hope v. Pelzer, 536
U.S. 730, 741 (2002)).
167
CARLISLE POLICE DEP’T, ANNUAL REPORT 9 (2008), available at http://www.carlislepa.org/
vertical/Sites/%7BDAE19CE2-0C18-44BC-A364-9960FD11CF6F%7D/uploads/%7B26769A02-E19D4FDD-8EEC-73FF6BA00E02%7D.pdf.
168
Id. at 9–10. The Municipal Police Officers’ Education and Training Program was created by
statute and provides for a commission that can “establish and administer the minimum courses of study
for basic and in-service training for police officers and to revoke an officer’s certification when an
officer fails to comply with the basic and in-service training requirements,” 53 PA. CONS. STAT.
§ 2164(1) (2010), and “require[s] every police officer to attend a minimum number of hours of inservice training,” id. § 2164(6).
169
2007 MIST Topics, COMMONWEALTH OF PA. MUN. POLICE OFFICERS’ EDUC. & TRAINING
COMM’N, http://www.portal.state.pa.us/portal/server.pt/community/mpoetc/7545/training/595035 (last
visited Mar. 18, 2012). Although this source was easily retrieved through a Google search, Brian Kelly’s
attorneys failed to cite to these documents as strong evidence that Officer Rogers actually knew of these
cases. See Brief of Appellant at 25–32, Kelly, 622 F.3d at 248 (No. 09-2644), 2009 WL 6358608 at *25–
31.
170
See, e.g., Robinson v. Fetterman, 378 F. Supp. 2d 534, 542 (E.D. Pa. 2005).
171
MANHEIM TOWNSHIP POLICE DEP’T, POLICY MANUAL 1 (2007), available at http://www.
aele.org/law/2009all05/manheim.pdf.
164
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assume that a township within an hour of the Borough of Carlisle would
possess exclusive knowledge of such a right.
Given the facts of the case, the relevant caselaw, and the Kelly court’s
failure to definitively establish that Officer Rogers lacked actual knowledge
of the right, the Third Circuit should have concluded that the right to record
the police was clearly established and conducted a merits analysis of
Kelly’s constitutional claims. Doing so would have brought the Third
Circuit’s opinion in line with the First Circuit’s more recent holding in Glik
v. Cunniffe,172 at least in terms of analytical procedure. The next sections
further support this conclusion with a more detailed examination of
evidence from outside the Third Circuit,173 background information on the
historical and traditional practice of the public monitoring of police
conduct, and a review of contemporary legal scholarship.
C. The Right to Record Police Is “Clearly Established”
Although the “clearly established” standard is generally considered
within the “specific context of the case” and not as a “broad general
proposition,”174 numerous sources—in addition to First Circuit’s decision in
Glik v. Cunniffe—support the idea that the right to record the police is
clearly established at the national level.175 A “right” is “[s]omething that is
due to a person by just claim, legal guarantee, or moral principle.”176 As
such, intracircuit caselaw (an example of a right established by “legal
guarantee”) is only one piece of the puzzle, and therefore additional sources
should be considered persuasive when determining whether a right is
clearly established. Subsection C.1 examines established caselaw in circuit
courts of appeal, subsection C.2 outlines the historical and traditional
practice of the public monitoring police conduct, and subsection C.3 briefly
presents contemporary legal scholarship. These sources are useful not only
because a circuit’s own precedent may not necessarily capture the
overriding “moral principle” of the right, but also because these numerous
sources necessarily interact to “establish” rights and communicate them to
the general public.
1. Smith v. City of Cumming.—The right to record police conduct
was first promulgated by the Eleventh Circuit in its 2000 opinion Smith v.
City of Cumming.177 In Smith, plaintiffs James and Barbara Smith filed a suit

172

655 F.3d 78 (1st Cir. 2011); see also supra Part II.B.1 (discussing the First Circuit’s opinion).
See, e.g., Bergeron v. Cabral, 560 F.3d 1, 11 (2009) (“The court should search the relevant
authorities both in circuit and out of circuit.”).
174
Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001).
175
The Fourteenth Amendment renders the First Amendment applicable to the states. E.g., Edwards
v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 235 (1963) (citing Supreme Court cases).
176
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1436 (9th ed. 2009).
177
212 F.3d 1332, 1333 (11th Cir. 2000).
173
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alleging harassment against the City of Cumming Police Department
(CCPD) under § 1983.178 Although not binding outside the Eleventh
Circuit,179 the facts of the case make the ruling particularly persuasive.
In response to what the couple thought to be an improper traffic stop
conducted on Mrs. Smith, Mr. Smith used a police scanner180 and a video
camera to randomly track and videotape police officers making traffic stops
to try to obtain evidence of the police improperly stopping other vehicles.181
Mr. Smith never interfered with the police activity and always recorded
their conduct from public property.182 Nevertheless, the CCPD obtained an
arrest warrant for Mr. Smith for “videotaping of . . . police officers.”183
After continued harassment,184 the Smiths filed suit under § 1983 for
damages.185 The district court dismissed the Smiths’s claim and they
appealed to the Eleventh Circuit.186 The court held that the Smiths “had a
First Amendment right, subject to reasonable time, place, and manner
restrictions, to photograph or videotape police conduct,” adding that the
“First Amendment protects the right to gather information about what
public officials do on public property, and specifically, a right to record
matters of public interest.”187
When applied to the facts, this holding means that Mr. Smith was
within his First Amendment rights to use a police scanner and video camera
to follow and record police officers making traffic stops.188 That Mr. Smith

178

Brief of Appellant, supra note 155, at 3–10.
See POSNER, supra note 146, at 380 (“[T]he thirteen courts of appeals constitute at best a loose
confederacy, brought under some semblance of unity only by their common subjection to the ultimate
authority of the Supreme Court.”).
180
In Florida, use of police scanners is legal as long as it is not done in furtherance of a crime. FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 843.167(1)(a) (West Supp. 2012) (“A person may not [i]ntercept any police radio
communication by use of a scanner or any other means for the purpose of using that communication to
assist in committing a crime or to escape from or avoid detection, arrest, trial, conviction, or punishment
in connection with the commission of such crime.”).
181
Brief of Appellant, supra note 155, at 11.
182
Id.
183
Id.
184
CCPD officers obtained an arrest warrant against Mr. Smith for videotaping the police and
allegedly “intimidate[d]” and “embarrass[ed]” the Smiths with it at their place of business. Id.
185
Smith v. City of Cumming, 212 F.3d 1332, 1332 (11th Cir. 2000).
186
Id.
187
Id. at 1333. However, the court also found that the Smiths failed to demonstrate that the CCPD
violated this right. Id. (“Although the Smiths have a right to videotape police activities, they have not
shown that the Defendants’ actions violated that right.”).
188
See Brief of Appellant, supra note 155, at 11 (“If the [the police] performed a stop, [Mr. Smith]
would videotape the traffic stop.” (emphasis added)). Of course, this fact completely undermines the
Third Circuit’s claim that its “decision [in Kelly v. Borough of Carlisle] on the First Amendment
question is further supported by the fact that none of the precedents [including Smith v. City of
Cumming] . . . involve[] traffic stops,” Kelly v. Borough of Carlisle, 622 F.3d 248, 262 (3d Cir. 2010),
rendering its holding even less persuasive. See discussion supra note 155.
179
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actively followed the police to record their conduct strengthens the
argument that this right exists and is clearly established because his actions
are much more invasive than what many others are currently trying to do.
Rather than follow the police looking for improper conduct, most police
recorders are more likely to observe the police interacting with members of
the public by happenstance, take out their cell phones, and press “record.”189
Therefore, Smith supports the First Amendment rights of individuals to take
spontaneous recordings, as well as those of third-party watchdog groups
who are as active as Mr. Smith in tracking and monitoring police conduct.190
Although Smith speaks to more modern means of making audio and video
recordings to report police conduct, the act of observing the police and
publicly disseminating complaints is a practice that dates back hundreds of
years.
2. Historical Public Monitoring of the Police.—The police enjoy a
unique grant of state power: “they are the only representatives of
governmental authority who are legally permitted to use force against the
citizen.”191 As such, their actions must be subject to public observation and
reporting in a democratic society. The purpose of police in the American
democratic experiment192 has always been to protect the “common good.”193
America’s earliest police force, the “citizen Watchmen” of Boston,194 was
established in 1636 because of a general sentiment that communities should
have watchers.195 Modern policing is a function of these colonial

189
See, e.g., Hillary Federico, Quinnipiac Students Claim Police Brutality, 1 Arrested After Taping
Cops, MIDDLETOWN PRESS (Sept. 29, 2010, 12:41 PM), http://www.middletownpress.com/articles/
2010/09/29/news/doc4ca29f3b65426189342936.txt; Alan Zarembo, Confrontation Between Sheriff’s
Deputies, Bus Rider Caught on Tape, L.A. TIMES BLOG (Jan. 11, 2012, 10:37 AM), http://latimesblogs.
latimes.com/lanow/2012/01/confrontation-between-deputies-bus-rider-caught-on-tape.html.
190
Paul Crawley, Overzealous Cops Cost Atlanta $40,000 for Seizing Video, 11ALIVE ATLANTA
WXIA TV (Feb. 11, 2011, 8:24 PM), http://www.11alive.com/news/local/story.aspx?storyid=177508
(“‘If you stand back away from the officers and you’re in a public place, you have an absolute right
under 11th Circuit [Court of Appeals] law to photograph or video [tape] those officers,’ said Dan
Grossman . . . .” (alterations in original)). Attorney Dan Grossman represented a member of a watchdog
group who was allegedly assaulted by the police for recording their conduct. Id.
191
ZENITH GROSS & ALAN REITMAN, ACLU, POLICE POWER AND CITIZENS’ RIGHTS: THE CASE
FOR AN INDEPENDENT POLICE REVIEW BOARD 4 (1966).
192
See Wilbur R. Miller, Police Authority in London and @ew York City 1830–1870, J. SOC. HIST.,
Winter 1975, at 81, 83 (arguing that American “representative democracy” caused police in midnineteenth century New York City to view their authority in a much different way than their
contemporaries in London).
193
See SAVAGE, supra note †, at 13.
194
Id.
195
See RAYMOND B. FOSDICK, AMERICAN POLICE SYSTEMS 59 (1920) (“As early as 1636 a night
watch was established in Boston, and thereafter hardly an important settlement existed in New England
that did not have, in addition to its military guard, a few ununiformed watchmen.” (footnote omitted)).
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community ideals,196 making the police “representatives or agents of
society” and rendering their actions a proxy for citizen actions.197 Moreover,
police officers are themselves members of the community,198 making them
aware of their responsibility to the public as its representatives199 and the
public’s corresponding democratic right to monitor their actions.200
The democratic right to monitor and report on police conduct has been
documented for more than a century. For example, in response to an assault
and battery conviction against a police officer, the Chicago Tribune
published an editorial in 1857 arguing that police officers who exceed their
authority should “suffer the consequences” of the punishment they
“deserve,” lamenting that violating officers often escape punishment
because “those whom they oppress are too poor or too ignorant to enforce
their rights.”201 In 1892, the @ew York Times ran an even clearer and more
direct report of police misconduct: a sixty-one-year-old man that was
allegedly beaten and critically injured by police after being arrested for
refusing to pay his streetcar fare.202 The Chicago Tribune reported a
factually similar altercation in 1893 between a policeman and a “negro
porter,” where the porter alleged that the officer “peremptorily ordered”
him into a basement and “appended to his order a kick and a stroke from his
billy, which left an ugly scar on the negro’s forehead.”203 About two weeks
later, the Chicago Tribune published an editorial that chastised a police
officer for physically striking and arresting a citizen when he threatened to
report the officer for failing to clear a crowded street.204 The author then
approvingly described the offending officer’s dismissal from the police

196

MARY JEANETTE HAGEMAN, POLICE–COMMUNITY RELATIONS 14–16 (James A. Inciardi ed.,

1985).
197

See Deborah Johnson, Morality and Police Harm, in ETHICS, PUBLIC POLICY, AND CRIMINAL
JUSTICE 79, 86 (Frederick Elliston & Norman Bowie eds., 1982); see also DAVID ALAN SKLANSKY,
DEMOCRACY AND THE POLICE 86 (2008) (“[C]ommunities exist, . . . have coherent views and interests,
and . . . law enforcement, and the criminal justice system more generally, can and should reflect those
interests.”); VICTOR G. STRECHER, THE ENVIRONMENT OF LAW ENFORCEMENT 15 (1971) (“The
conclusion is inescapable that in this country, perhaps for the first time recorded in history, policemen
are proxies for other citizens.”).
198
W. H. Parker, The Police Role in Community Relations, 47 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POL.
SCI. 368, 371 (1956) (“A police department is . . . merely a group of citizens employed to exercise
certain functions. It is created by the public, shaped by the public, and operated by the public.”).
199
See HAGEMAN, supra note 196, at 22.
200
E.g., G. Richards, Effective Police-Community Relations Are the Cornerstone of the Prevention
and Detection of Crime, 65 POLICE J. 10, 13 (1992) (“The police . . . recognize the citizen’s democratic
right to monitor and criticize police actions which affect public welfare.”).
201
Editorial, Policemen and Their Duties, CHI. DAILY TRIB., Sept. 3, 1857, at 1.
202
See Says Policemen Beat Him, N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 1892, at 5.
203
Says a Policeman Assaulted Him, CHI. DAILY TRIB., Mar. 18, 1893, at 1.
204
See Editorial, Remonstrating with Policemen, CHI. DAILY TRIB., Apr. 6, 1893, at 4.
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force following an unsuccessful defense of his actions in “police court.”205
The pages of nineteenth-century newspapers swelled with reports of police
officers being arrested,206 charged,207 and subsequently convicted208 or
acquitted209 of misconduct and brutality.
Over time, the complaint process has become more formalized with the
creation of police oversight committees staffed by civilians and funded by
state and local governments.210 These boards exist all over the United States
and have been around in some form for more than sixty years.211 Generally,
these oversight boards investigate and recommend punishment for police
misconduct.212 Of course, concrete evidence of misconduct in the form of a
video on a cell phone would make these bodies more effective because they
would generally have stronger evidence to help determine which claims
have merit and which do not.213
205

Id.; see also Fighting the Police Is Timewell’s Life Work, BOS. GLOBE, Apr. 4, 1909, at SM5
(praising a tailor in London, England, who made reporting, challenging, and “[f]ighting” police abuse
his “life[’s] work”).
206
E.g., Arrest of a Lieutenant of Police on a Charge of Assault and Battery, N.Y. DAILY TIMES,
Nov. 14, 1856, at 6 (reporting that the Lieutenant of the Thirteenth Ward Police was “in trouble again”
for “assault[ing a] deponent”); Arrest of Police Officers Charged with Burglary, N.Y. DAILY, Jan. 13,
1853, at 8 (describing police officers who were arrested for an alleged burglary at a “wholesale grocery
store”).
207
E.g., A Strange Case, ATLANTA CONST., Oct. 22, 1884, at 3D (reporting that three police
officers were charged with a “very serious assault”); Patrolman Hogan on Trial, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22,
1889, at 8 (reporting charges that “[p]atrolman Peter Hogan . . . assaulted . . . a baker, . . . striking him
with a heavy cane and fracturing his skull”); Proceedings of the Courts, SUN (Balt.), Sept. 2, 1861, at 1
(reporting that a police officer was charged with assault); Several Police Officers Dismissed and Others
Reprimanded, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 22, 1870, at 3 (“Patrolman Thomas Flynn . . . was charged ‘with
neglecting to treat persons civilly and respectfully on all occasions, and intoxication.’ He was discharged
from the force.”); The Rights of Colored Persons, THE LIBERATOR (Bos.), May 13, 1853, at 75
(reporting that a police officer was charged for pushing a woman down stairs); Two Police Officers
Charged with Brutality to Citizens, CHI. DAILY TRIB., Aug. 26, 1882, at 12 (reporting that police
officers were charged with “brutally assault[ing]” a woman “during a fracas over the building of a
fence” and “str[iking] in the face” a witness who “protested against such brutality”).
208
E.g., A @ew M.P. Convicted of Assault and Battery, N.Y. DAILY TIMES, July 20, 1857, at 3.
209
In 1858, The Sun reported that a police officer was tried for assault when he allegedly “seized [a
woman] by the throat” and then “choked her and pushed her violently against a door.” Proceedings of
the Courts, SUN (Balt.), Mar. 2, 1858, at 1. The next day, the same paper reported that the jury “rendered
a verdict of ‘not guilty.’” Proceedings of the Courts, SUN (Balt.), Mar. 3, 1858, at 1.
210
See, e.g., Cheryl Beattie & Ronald Weitzer, Race, Democracy and Law: Civilian Review of
Police in Washington, DC, in CIVILIAN OVERSIGHT OF POLICING 41, 51–52 (Andrew Goldsmith &
Colleen Lewis eds., 2000) (discussing the establishment of Washington, D.C.’s publicly funded
“Civilian Complaint Review Board” to adjudicate “all non-frivolous complaints” against the police).
211
See James R. Hudson, Police Review Boards and Police Accountability, 36 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 515, 520, 523, 526 (1971) (explaining that the “Civilian Complaint Review Board” was
established in New York City in 1953 and that the “Philadelphia Police Review Board” was established
in 1958).
212
Id. at 520.
213
See Deborah Jian Lee, @YPD Calls On Citizens for Amateur Video Evidence, REUTERS (July 31,
2008,
6:02
PM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2008/07/31/us-newyork-crime-video-
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It is becoming easier than ever for citizens to monitor the police given
the ubiquity of cell phones able to record, edit, and instantly publish videos
to the Internet.214 Using a cell phone to record and disseminate police
conduct is functionally identical to the traditional democratic right to
observe and report police conduct. The only difference is that a camera is
used instead of eyewitness testimony and hearsay—a change that actually
benefits the accuracy of reporting misconduct.215
3. First Amendment Doctrine.—This section summarizes the work of
four authors who have addressed the First Amendment right to record
police conduct, covering a number of ways in which the First Amendment
protects the right of individuals to record police. They have not, however,
discussed the doctrine of prior restraint. Professor Seth Kreimer argues that
videotaping the police conveys a message and is inherently expressive, and
that these “captured images” therefore constitute speech protected by the
First Amendment,216 even if they are not outwardly shared with another
person.217 He also argues that the right to record the police is protected by
the right to gather information under the First Amendment.218
Professor Howard Wasserman argues that the First Amendment’s Free
Press and Petition Clauses also protect the right to record police conduct.219
For the former, he suggests that modern technology has created a low-cost
means to capture and disseminate video, making virtually anyone a member
of the press because they can share information as easily as media outlets.220
For the latter, he writes that recording the police facilitates petitioning the

idUSN3136650420080731 (“Soon citizen sleuths can transmit evidence of criminal activity directly to
the police and 911, including evidence of police misconduct . . . .”).
214
See Cohen, supra note 13.
215
See Parker, supra note 198, at 375 (complaining that negative newspaper articles about police
misconduct “were written solely from the unsubstantiated account given by the arrestee”); see also Gary
L. Wells et al., Accuracy, Confidence, and Juror Perceptions in Eyewitness Identification, 64 J. APPLIED
PSYCHOL. 440, 440 (1979) (“[S]taged-crime research indicates that eyewitness identifications are often
unreliable.”).
216
Kreimer, supra note 26, at 372–74. This was published in 2011, after the Third Circuit decided
Kelly v. Borough of Carlisle, 622 F.3d 248 (3d Cir. 2010). See discussion supra Part II.B.2. Professor
Kreimer also argues that recording the police is speech, not conduct, because image capture with
modern technology facilitates the subsequent transfer and dissemination of the footage. Kreimer, supra
note 26, at 375–76.
217
Kreimer, supra note 26, at 377–78.
218
Id. at 387, 390–91. Professor Kreimer notes, however, that the right to gather information has
been rejected by the Supreme Court as an “an unadorned First Amendment [right] that supersedes other
legal obligations.” Id. at 387.
219
Wasserman, supra note 77, at 656–58. Professor Wasserman’s article was published and
available before the Third Circuit decided Kelly. See discussion supra Part II.B.2.
220
See id. at 657; see also About C@@ iReport, CNN IREPORT, http://ireport.cnn.com/about.jspa
(last visited Mar. 18, 2012) (inviting the average citizen to partake in news reporting).
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government to redress grievances because video footage provides a reliable,
“unambiguous,” and “conclusive” source of information.221
Finally, two student pieces discuss the right to record police conduct
under the First Amendment: Lisa Skehill argues that it falls within the right
to gather information;222 Jesse Alderman argues that the public has the right
to receive information about police conduct.223 Prior restraint is the only
area of First Amendment doctrine that has not been applied to recording
police conduct.
III. PRIOR RESTRAINT
The doctrine of prior restraint refers to the suppression of speech
before it reaches the public. Prior restraints traditionally took the form of
requirements that individuals submit their speech to a government official
for approval before sharing it with the public.224 The prohibition against
prior restraint has its roots in seventeenth-century England. Before 1688,
nothing could be published without approval from the Office of the
Imprimateur.225 When that office was abolished, censorship disappeared and
the press was “said to be free.”226 This idea of a free press was imported to
the United States and immortalized in the Free Press Clause of the First
Amendment to the Constitution.227
This Part applies the doctrine of prior restraint to recording and sharing
depictions of police conduct. First, it outlines the rule established in @ear v.
Minnesota228 that prior restraints on speech are presumptively invalid and
applies that rule to citizens recording the police; it continues by discussing
the exceptions to this rule articulated in @ear and shows that recording the
police falls outside them. Second, it presents the post-@ear expansion of
what actions the Court considers prior restraint, showing them to
221

Wasserman, supra note 77, at 658–59.
Skehill, supra note 5, at 1000–02. But see Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 17 (1965) (“The right to
speak and publish does not carry with it the unrestrained right to gather information.”); Kreimer, supra
note 26, at 387 (quoting Zemel, 381 U.S. at 17).
223
Alderman, supra note 74, at 521–25.
224
Emerson, supra note 42, at 648; see also id. at 650 (“As early as 1501, Pope Alexander VI, in a
bull which prohibited unlicensed printing, applied the technique of prior restraint as a means of control.
In England . . . printing first developed under royal sponsorship and soon became a monopoly to be
granted by the Crown. . . . The Licensing Act of 1662 illustrates the scope of the system. Not only were
seditious and heretical books and pamphlets prohibited, but no person was allowed to print any material
unless it was first [approved by agencies of the Crown].”); 2 THOMAS PAINE, Liberty of the Press, in
THE POLITICAL WRITINGS OF THOMAS PAINE 463, 464 (George H. Evans ed., G.H. Evans 1839) (1824)
(describing early systems of prior restraint in England and France).
225
PAINE, supra note 224, at 434.
226
Id. (explaining that, “inconsequence of [the] abolition,” work could “be published without first
obtaining the permission of the government officer”).
227
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
228
283 U.S. 697 (1931).
222
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encompass restrictions on citizens recording the police. Finally, it
demonstrates that, contrary to the beliefs of some, “subsequent punishment”
is a form of prior restraint, and argues that situations like Anthony Graber’s
fit within the subsequent-punishment-as-prior-restraint framework.
A. Near v. Minnesota
The landmark Supreme Court case that wrestled with the issue of prior
restraint was @ear v. Minnesota.229 There, the Court considered a Minnesota
statute declaring a nuisance any publication that state officials––including
the police––considered “obscene, lewd and lascivious” or “malicious,
scandalous and defamatory.”230 The statute granted courts the authority to
permanently prevent such speech and punish the speaker with a fine,
imprisonment, or both.231
The issue in @ear arose when a county attorney successfully brought
an action to enjoin publication of The Saturday Press for printing articles
that alleged, among other things, that “law enforcing officers” were not
“energetically performing their duties.”232 Of particular relevance to the
topic of this Comment is that “[m]ost of the [publication’s] charges were
directed against the Chief of Police; he was charged with gross neglect of
duty, illicit relations with gangsters, and with participation in graft.”233
Writing for a 5–4 majority,234 Chief Justice Hughes protected the
publication’s right to criticize police officers by invalidating the statute as
an unconstitutional “previous restraint[]” on speech, comfortably couching
his reasoning in the First Amendment’s Free Press Clause.235 Chief Justice
Hughes noted that this right was “especially cherished for the immunity it
afforded from previous restraint of the publication of censure of public
officers and charges of official misconduct.”236
The right to record the police and the way it is being prevented in
states with all-party consent wiretapping statutes is eerily analogous to
@ear. Where the police in @ear found that a publication criticizing police
officers violated a statute that prohibited “scandalous” speech, so too are the
police in all-party consent states finding that citizens who record their
conduct violate state wiretapping statutes. In so doing, the police are using
state wiretapping statutes to prevent communication of a message that may
229

Id.
MINN. STAT. § 10123-1 to -2 (Mason’s 1927) (superseded by @ear, 283 U.S. at 697).
231
See id. § 10123-3.
232
@ear, 283 U.S. at 703–04.
233
Id. at 704.
234
Id. at 701, 738.
235
Id. at 716 (“The exceptional nature of its limitations places in a strong light the general
conception that liberty of the press, historically considered and taken up by the Federal Constitution, has
meant, principally although not exclusively, immunity from previous restraints or censorship.”).
236
Id. at 717.
230
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be (but is not necessarily) critical of them. And, just as the Minnesota
authorities attempted to punish the publishers in order to prevent speech,
police are attempting the same prior restraint today by threatening recorders
at the scene,237 confiscating their cameras,238 arresting them,239 or, as with
Anthony Graber, punishing them after the video has been disseminated.240
Because these efforts are geared towards preventing the public from
receiving messages critical of the police,241 this is essentially the same form
of prior restraint Chief Justice Hughes ruled unconstitutional in @ear, albeit
with slightly sleeker technology.
B. Exceptions to the Presumptive Invalidity of Prior Restraint
The Court’s decision in @ear v. Minnesota242 effectively created a
presumption that prior restraints on speech are unconstitutional.243 However,
Chief Justice Hughes also suggested that the government may successfully
rebut this presumption and suppress speech in the “exceptional cases”
when: (1) it would “obstruct[] . . . [military] recruiting . . . or [disclose]
sailing dates of transports or the number and location of troops,” (2) “the
primary requirements of decency [need to] be enforced against obscene
publications,” or (3) “[t]he security of the community life [needs to] be
protected against incitements to acts of violence and the overthrow by force
of orderly government.”244 Even if one of these three standards is met, a
restraint is only properly imposed when the “evil that would result . . . is
both great and certain and cannot be mitigated by less intrusive
measures.”245
The only @ear exception that recording police conduct could
conceivably fall under is the third, a standard the Court elaborated on in
@ew York Times Co. v. United States (The Pentagon Papers Case).246 There,
the federal government sought a temporary restraining order and
237

E.g., Ickes v. Borough of Bedford, 271 F.R.D. 458, 459 (W.D. Pa. 2010); Connell v. Town of
Hudson, 733 F. Supp. 465, 466–67 (D.N.H. 1990).
238
E.g., Channel 10, Inc. v. Gunnarson, 337 F. Supp. 634, 636–37 (D. Minn. 1972).
239
E.g., Adkins v. Guam Police Dep’t, No. 09-00029, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87353, at *6–7 (D.
Guam Aug. 24, 2010).
240
E.g., State v. Graber, No. 12-K-10-647, 2010 Md. Cir. Ct. LEXIS 7, at *1, *5 (Md. Cir. Ct. Sept.
27, 2010). If this subsequent punishment is frequent and public, then it will strongly discourage this
speech in the future. See infra Part III.D.
241
See RICHARD A. POSNER, NOT A SUICIDE PACT: THE CONSTITUTION IN A TIME OF NATIONAL
SECURITY 107 (2006) (arguing the government should not be able to classify information, and thereby
prevent the public from obtaining it, just because it would “embarrass the agency by revealing its
mistakes”).
242
283 U.S. 697 (1931).
243
JEROME A. BARRON & C. THOMAS DIENES, FIRST AMENDMENT LAW 57 (4th ed. 2008).
244
@ear, 283 U.S. at 716.
245
CBS Inc. v. Davis, 510 U.S. 1315, 1317 (1994).
246
403 U.S. 713 (1971).
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preliminary injunction against the @ew York Times to prevent it from
publishing classified documents about the Vietnam War.247 The Court
permitted publication of the documents and held that the court-ordered
injunction preventing publication was an unconstitutional prior restraint.248
The guiding standard emerged from the concurrences of Justices Stewart
and Brennan249: the government must show that allowing publication will
“surely result in direct, immediate, and irreparable damage to our Nation or
its people.”250 Thus, the @ear presumption against prior restraints is
rebuttable in the face of “extreme danger to national security.”251
Recording police conduct does not pose a direct, immediate,
irreparable threat to any community or its people. Although footage of
police misconduct might cause some initial tumult,252 this is not irreparable
and does not necessarily pose immediate danger to national security. In fact,
the Transportation Security Administration does not even prohibit filming
at airport security checkpoints,253 and if anything could rise to the level of
threatening national security such that recording law enforcement officials
is justifiably prohibited under a @ear exception, surely it would be a

247

Id. at 714.
Id.
249
See Thomas R. Litwak, The Doctrine of Prior Restraint, 12 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 519, 544–
45 (1977). Compare The Pentagon Papers Case, 403 U.S. at 730 (Stewart, J., concurring) (concluding
that an attempted restriction on newspaper publication requires a showing that the underlying content
will “surely result in direct, immediate, and irreparable damage to our Nation or its people”), with id. at
726–27 (Brennan, J., concurring) (“[O]nly governmental allegation and proof that publication must
inevitably, directly, and immediately cause the concurrence of an event kindred to imperiling the safety
of a transport already at sea can support even the issuance of an interim restraining order. . . . Unless and
until the Government has clearly made out its case, the First Amendment commands that no injunction
may issue.”).
250
The Pentagon Papers Case, 403 U.S. at 730 (Stewart, J., concurring).
251
BARRON & DIENES, supra note 243, at 63 (emphasis added); see also CBS Inc. v. Davis, 510
U.S. 1315, 1317 (1994) (“Even where questions of allegedly urgent national security . . . are concerned,
we have imposed this ‘most extraordinary remed[y]’ only where the evil that would result from the
reportage is both great and certain and cannot be mitigated by less intrusive measures” (alteration in
original) (quoting Neb. Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 562 (1976))); Bantam Books, Inc. v.
Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963) (“Any system of prior restraints of expression comes to this Court
bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity.”).
252
For example, this was the case in the wake of the Rodney King video and trial in 1991 and 1992.
Associated Press, Bush Directs Federal Forces to Riot Area, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES (Fla.), May 2,
1992, at 6A.
253
Can I Take Photos at the Checkpoint and Airport?, TSA BLOG (Mar. 31, 2009), http://blog.
tsa.gov/2009/03/can-i-take-photos-at-checkpoint-and.html
(“[The
Transportation
Security
Administration of the United States Department of Homeland Security doesn’t] prohibit public,
passengers or press from photographing, videotaping, or filming at [airport] screening locations. You
can take pictures at our checkpoints as long as you’re not interfering with the screening process or
slowing things down. We also ask that you do not film or take pictures of our monitors.”).
248
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potential threat to airport security.254 Finally, exposing police misconduct is
equally likely to produce increased oversight over police, leading to reform
and eventually more stability, not less.255
C. Post-Near Expansion of What Constitutes Prior Restraint
Although prior restraint doctrine has changed little in the wake of
@ear, the Court’s conception of what constitutes an unconstitutional prior
restraint on speech has broadened over the years. Prior restraint in the
United States has historically been thought of in terms of a judicial
injunction or a statutory licensing requirement,256 but it has expanded to
include other forms of governmental speech suppression, such as taxes on
newspaper publication processes257 or city ordinances allowing a mayor to
approve permits for newspaper vending machines placed on public
property.258
The prohibition on prior restraints as originally expressed in @ear
applies to any government actor, including a police officer.259 The Supreme
Court made this application explicit eight years after @ear in Schneider v.
State.260 In Schneider, the Court struck down four city ordinances as
unconstitutional prior restraints on speech.261 These city ordinances required
a government official, usually a police officer or the city’s police chief, to
approve a citizen’s flyers or handbills before the citizen could distribute
them.262 The Court held that, “a municipality cannot . . . require all who
wish to disseminate ideas to present them first to police authorities for their

254

See Sally B. Donnelly, Behind the Airport Shutdowns, TIME, Mar. 18, 2002, at 26 (stating that
security fears and “suspicious” items like a food processor or a pair of scissors found in a trash can
cause an airport to be completely shutdown).
255
See Goldsmith, supra note 33, at 922–23 (stating that footage of police misconduct at the 2009
G20 conference in London, England, “led to various investigations relating not just to this incident, but
also to the policing of the G20 protests more generally” and “triggered and shaped the involvement of
the oversight agency in a significant way”).
256
BARRON & DIENES, supra note 243, at 56–57.
257
See Minn. Star & Tribune Co. v. Minn. Comm’r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 586 n.9, 592–93
(1983); Marin Scordato, Distinction Without a Difference: A Reappraisal of the Doctrine of Prior
Restraint, 68 N.C. L. REV. 7 (1989).
258
See City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ’g Co., 486 U.S. 750, 757, 772 (1988).
259
See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 713 (1931) (“[T]he operation and effect of the statute in
substance is that public authorities may bring the owner or publisher of a newspaper or periodical before
a judge upon a charge of conducting a business of publishing scandalous and defamatory matter—in
particular that the matter consists of charges against public officers of official dereliction—and unless
the owner or publisher is able and disposed to bring competent evidence to satisfy the judge that the
charges are true and are published with good motives and for justifiable ends, his newspaper or
periodical is suppressed and further publication is made punishable as a contempt.” (emphasis added)).
260
308 U.S. 147 (1939).
261
Id. at 165.
262
Id. at 163–64.
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consideration and approval, with a discretion in the police to say some ideas
may, while others may not, be carried to the homes of citizens.”263
The Court again invoked prior restraint to declare the same type of
police preapproval of speech unconstitutional in Cox v. Louisiana.264 In
Cox, the appellant led a group of protestors in an antisegregation speech
outside the State Capitol building, the local courthouse, and various
businesses in Baton Rouge, Louisiana.265 Although the content of the speech
and the demeanor of the crowd were peaceful,266 the Sheriff deemed the
gathering “inflammatory” and instructed the demonstrators to disperse.267 In
doing so, he invoked his power under Louisiana state law to arrest and
charge individuals who were disobeying his command with disturbing the
peace.268 The Court invalidated as unconstitutional the appellant’s
conviction under the Louisiana statute.269 Although the Court did not use the
words “prior restraint,” its explanation of the discretionary application of a
broad state statute that gives law enforcement officials the power to choose
which speech may occur embodies the same definition.270
Schneider and Cox are readily applied to police officers and
prosecutors who use all-party consent wiretapping laws to justify arresting
and prosecuting citizens who record police conduct. The wiretapping
statutes, though not necessarily overbroad, are being given extensive
interpretation by police and prosecutors.271 This interpretation gives them

263

Id. at 164.
379 U.S. 536 (1965).
265
Id. at 539–42.
266
Id. at 542.
267
Id. at 543.
268
Id. at 544.
269
Id. at 558.
270
Compare id. at 557 (giving “broad discretion [to] a public official allows him to determine
which expressions of view will be permitted and which will not[, and] . . . thus sanctions a device for the
suppression of the communication of ideas and permits the official to act as a censor”), and id. at 557–58
(“It is clearly unconstitutional to enable a public official to determine which expressions of view will be
permitted and which will not or to engage in invidious discrimination among persons or groups either by
use of a statute providing a system of broad discretionary licensing power or, as in this case, the
equivalent of such a system by selective enforcement of an extremely broad prohibitory statute.”), with
Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931) (“[L]iberty of the press, historically considered and taken
up by the Federal Constitution, has meant, principally although not exclusively, immunity from previous
restraints or censorship.”), and Emerson, supra note 42, at 648 (“The concept of prior restraint, roughly
speaking, deals with official restriction imposed upon speech or other forms of expression in advance of
actual publication.”).
271
See, e.g., Talk of the @ation: The Rules and Your Rights for Recording Arrests (NPR radio
broadcast July 8, 2010), available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=128387108
(“[T]he way that Maryland law enforcement officials have interpreted this law, when a police officer
pulls you over, he has an expectation of privacy with respect to what transpires during the interaction.”).
“Extensive interpretation” is “[a] liberal interpretation that applies a statutory provision to a case not
falling within its literal words.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 894 (9th ed. 2009).
264
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considerable discretion in restricting “expressions of view,”272 namely
unfavorable views of the police. That discretion runs counter to the dictates
of @ear, which clearly established the right to be free from censure for
publicly criticizing public officials.273 Therefore, the discretionary
enforcement of state wiretapping statutes against individuals recording
police conduct is an unconstitutional prior restraint on speech. The First
Amendment violation is further illuminated by the fact that the police—the
very public officials who run the risk of being criticized—are tasked with
determining whether to restrain an individual’s speech as a violation of a
statute.
Some courts have also ruled that physically preventing a person from
capturing images is a form of prior restraint.274 In these instances, the
“physical” prohibition was seizing the video equipment275 or arresting the
videographer.276 Thus, one court stated that police seizing a news crew’s
cameras and film as they filmed a burglary was “at least as effective a prior
restraint—if not more so—as [the government’s actions] in @ew York Times
v. United States.”277 And if seizing a videographer’s camera and film is a
form of prior restraint, then detaining or arresting him surely is as well.278 In
Robinson v. Fetterman, the plaintiff was arrested for filming the police
making stops on the highway from private property onto which he had
permission to enter.279 The police detained the plaintiff at the police station
for several hours and confiscated his camera.280 In finding that the plaintiff
“established his claim that the [police officers] retaliated against him for
exercising his First Amendment right to videotape police conduct,”281 the
court asserted that, “to the extent that the troopers were restraining [the
plaintiff] from making any future videotapes and from publicizing or
publishing what he had filmed, [their] conduct clearly amounted to an
unlawful prior restraint upon his protected speech.”282
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See, e.g., Jones v. City of Minneapolis, No. 07-3577, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84330, at *4 (D.
Minn. Sept. 15, 2009); Channel 10, 337 F. Supp. at 636.
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See McCormick v. City of Lawrence, 271 F. Supp. 2d 1292, 1303 (D. Kan. 2003).
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Channel 10, 337 F. Supp. at 637 (citing The Pentagon Papers Case, 403 U.S. 713 (1971)).
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See McCormick, 271 F. Supp. 2d at 1303 (“[A]n arrest may constitute a ‘prior restraint’ in some
circumstances.”)
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378 F. Supp. 2d 534, 539 (E.D. Pa. 2005).
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Id. at 539–40.
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Id. at 542.
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Id. at 541 (emphasis added). Not all courts agree on this point. Compare McCormick, 271 F.
Supp. 2d at 1303 (“[A]n arrest may constitute a ‘prior restraint’ in some circumstances.”), with
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an arrest may constitute a ‘prior restraint’ in some circumstances, the law is not clearly established.”)
(citations omitted).
273

308

106:273 (2012)

Citizens Recording Police Conduct

D. Subsequent Punishment Is Prior Restraint
Whereas prior restraint is a suppression of speech before it reaches the
public, subsequent punishment threatens283 or issues punishment after the
speech has been disseminated, indicating the government’s disapproval of
the speech’s content and its desire to prevent similar speech in the future.284
Although there is an argument that subsequent punishments are more
justifiable than—and therefore somehow different from—prior restraint,285
it is clear that repeatedly punishing the same speech will inevitably cause
potential speakers to either censor their messages or refrain from sharing
them entirely.286 Although the prior restraint and subsequent punishment
encompass different actions, the government’s desired outcome is the same:
to exclude what it deems are undesirable ideas from reaching the
marketplace287 by continuously enforcing laws that punish certain speech.
Therefore, subsequent punishment is a form of prior restraint.288
The artificial dichotomy between “prior restraint” and “subsequent
punishment” is problematic because it theoretically enables courts to permit
prior restraints on speech if the punishment occurs after the speech takes
place.289 The distinction first arose in American law in @ear v. Minnesota,
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See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963) (“The threat of sanctions may deter their
exercise [of First Amendment freedoms] almost as potently as the actual application of sanctions.”).
284
See Emerson, supra note 42, at 648; William T. Mayton, Toward a Theory of First Amendment
Process: Injunctions of Speech, Subsequent Punishment, and the Costs of the Prior Restraint Doctrine,
67 CORNELL L. REV. 245, 263 (1982).
285
Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 558–59 (1975) (“The presumption
against prior restraints is heavier—and the degree of protection broader—than that against limits on
expression imposed by criminal penalties. Behind the distinction is a theory deeply etched in our law: a
free society prefers to punish the few who abuse rights of speech after they break the law than to throttle
them and all others beforehand.”).
286
James Madison discussed the impropriety of the distinction between prior restraint and
subsequent punishment while castigating the Sedition Act in his Report on the Virginia Resolutions:
The freedom of the press, under the common law, is . . . made to consist in an exemption from all
previous restraint on printed publications, by persons authorized to inspect or prohibit them. It
appears to the committee that this idea of the freedom of the press can never be admitted to be the
American idea of it; since a law inflicting penalties on printed publications would have a similar
effect with a law authorizing a previous restraint on them. It would seem a mockery to say that no
laws should be passed preventing publications from being made, but that laws might be passed for
punishing them in case they should be made.
James Madison, Madison’s Reports on the Virginia Resolutions, in 4 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL
STATE CONVENTIONS OF THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, AS RECOMMENDED BY THE
GENERAL CONVENTION AT PHILADELPHIA IN 1787, at 546, 569 (Jonathan Elliot ed., J. B. Lippincott &
Co. 2d. ed. 1876) (1863); see also Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 98 n.12 (1940) (citing same).
287
John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Rethinking Prior Restraint, 92 YALE L.J. 409, 430 (1983).
288
But see 5 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
§ 20.16(c) (4th ed. 2008) (arguing that the difference between prior restraint and subsequent punishment
is that the former prevents speech from ever reaching the public but the latter does not).
289
See, e.g., Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S. 544, 550, 553 (1993).
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where Chief Justice Hughes approvingly cited to William Blackstone.290
However, both Blackstone and Chief Justice Hughes discussed the
dichotomy in the context of unprotected speech, neither anticipating that
subsequent punishment would be used to punish and therefore suppress
protected speech.291
The Court made clear its desire to prohibit subsequent punishment for
protected speech in Thornhill v. Alabama.292 There the Court held
unconstitutional an Alabama antilabor union statute that forbade “nearly
every practicable, effective means” of publicly communicating “the nature
and causes of a labor dispute.”293 In reaching that conclusion, it noted that
the statute “readily lends itself to harsh and discriminatory enforcement by
local prosecuting officials, against particular groups deemed to merit their
displeasure, [and] results in a continuous and pervasive restraint on all
freedom of discussion that might reasonably be regarded as within its
purview.”294 The Court found that subsequent punishment was a form of
prior restraint in Thornhill because the statute was being selectively
enforced to punish a certain type of speech, thereby discouraging that
speech from occurring in the first place.295
The distinction between prior restraint and subsequent punishment is
particularly problematic with the advent of mobile phone technology that
allows any member of the public to share content with a large audience at a
290
283 U.S. 697, 713–14 (1931) (“The liberty of the press is indeed essential to the nature of a free
state; but this consists in laying no previous restraints upon publications, and not in freedom from
censure for criminal matter when published.” (quoting 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *151)
(internal quotation mark omitted)).
291
“Protected activity” is “[c]onduct that is permitted or encouraged by a statute or constitutional
provision, and for which the actor may not be legally retaliated against.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY
1343 (9th ed. 2009). In the First Amendment context, “protected speech” cannot be constitutionally
suppressed by the Government. Blackstone argues that punishing speech after it occurs is sometimes
“necessary for the preservation of peace and good order,” 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
*152, which is analogous to the modern unprotected status of speech that would constitute “incitement
to imminent lawless action,” see Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 449 (1969). In @ear, Chief Justice
Hughes also appeared to limit permissible subsequent punishment of speech to unprotected
communication and not “harmless publications.” @ear, 283 U.S. at 715. Thus, Chief Justice Hughes was
stating that a subsequent punishment for unprotected speech is not a form of prior restraint, while the
same is not true if the speech is protected. Moreover, Chief Justice Hughes specifically noted that
“publication of censure of public officers and charges of official misconduct” is a form of “cherished”
protected speech. Id. at 717. Given the harm that Blackstone’s definition of prior restraint can cause to
free expression, it is no wonder Thomas Jefferson believed “Blackstone had done more towards the
suppression of liberties of man than all the millions of men in arms of Bonaparte.” GEOFFREY R. STONE,
PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME 42–43 (2004) (internal quotation marks omitted).
292
310 U.S. 88 (1940).
293
Id. at 104.
294
Id. at 97–98 (emphasis added).
295
See id. at 101–02 (“The freedom of speech and of the press guaranteed by the Constitution
embraces at the least the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully all matters of public concern without
previous restraint or fear of subsequent punishment.”).
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relatively low cost.296 The unpredictability and sheer volume of potential
speakers significantly weakens the government’s ability to prevent
undesired speech from reaching the public. This is where the threat of
subsequent punishment becomes useful as a form of prior restraint: while
the government cannot realistically prevent every video or photo from being
posted to the Internet, it can suppress speech by means of a policy of
punishment.297 Consistent enforcement of such a policy will eventually
make the public wary of engaging in that type of speech, ultimately ending
it altogether.298 In addition, the quantity of information people can receive
on a daily basis is staggering, making it harder for a single story or piece of
information to reach its target audience.299 Thus, a message is more likely to
be received the more frequently it is sent; if the government can enforce a
statute that by subsequent punishment impedes receipt of those messages,
they might never reach their intended audience.
Furthermore, when the messages are important to police officers and
prosecutors—as videos depicting police misconduct certainly are—efforts
to suppress them become much more direct. For example, “[s]pecific
warnings of prosecution from law enforcement officials create . . . [a]
focused threat, and indeed, such threats have been a favored mode of
suppression.”300 Or, threats might be abandoned in favor of openly and
actively prosecuting individuals that record the police.301 This sends a clear
message to the public that any form of resistance to or documentation of
police wrongdoing could subject that person to criminal sanctions.302 Thus,
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See Kreimer, supra note 26, at 344 (“In the emerging digital environment, broadly available and
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one negative video can harm their reputation with the public, Eric S. Jefferis et al., The Effect of a
Videotaped Arrest on Public Perceptions of Police Use of Force, 25 J. CRIM. JUST. 381, 391 (1997), and
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successfully attack the problem of crime.”).
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Mayton, supra note 284, at 263 (citing Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 63–64
(1963)).
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See, e.g., Goldsmith, supra note 33, at 921 (explaining one problem with “communicative
abundance” is “[t]he proliferation of accessible, but also often competing and conflicting accounts” of
events); Nicholas Carr, Is Google Making Us Stupid?, THE ATLANTIC, July/Aug. 2008, at 57 (“Even
when I’m not working, I’m as likely as not to be foraging in the Web’s info-thickets—reading and
writing e-mails, scanning headlines and blog posts, watching videos and listening to podcasts, or just
tripping from link to link to link.”).
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Mayton, supra note 284, at 265 (footnote omitted).
301
See Shin, supra note 8.
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Commonwealth v. Hyde, 750 N.E.2d 963, 976 (Mass. 2001) (Marshall, C.J., dissenting) (“[The
public’s role as watchdog] cannot be performed if citizens must fear criminal reprisals when they seek to
hold government officials responsible by recording—secretly recording on occasion—an interaction
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citizens who would otherwise want to record police conduct might decline
to do so rather than risk prosecution.303
Recording the police is precisely the type of activity that American
prior restraint doctrine—and the First Amendment generally—seeks to
protect. Although criticism (or praise) of the police by means of video
footage is protected speech,304 some argue that it should still be prohibited
because allowing it will have negative policy consequences that outweigh
the benefits of improved oversight. The next section rebuts some of those
policy arguments.
IV. POLICY
This Part presents four policy arguments that support allowing citizens
to record police officers’ conduct: (1) the inherently public nature of police
work undermines the argument that more widespread recording of the
police would “overdeter” their actions, (2) the potential dangers associated
with recording the police can be mitigated and do not outweigh the public
benefit of a monitored police force, (3) allowing citizens to record the
police could actually increase, rather than decrease, public trust in law
enforcement, and (4) the risk that some videos can be inaccurate or even
falsified could be minimized with police “counter-recording” and libel
lawsuits.
A. “Overdeterrence”
The inherently public nature of policing and its well-established
exposure to the public for observation and criticism make overdeterrence
resulting from citizens recording police conduct unlikely. The term
overdeterrence is used because videotaping the police should deter
improper actions but not prevent officers from addressing situations that
require attention. However, recording the police with the aim of achieving
safe streets and genteel officers may put officers in a quandary, with the
constant fear of reprisal driving them to inaction.305 This could make their
jobs more dangerous because criminals might detect an arresting officer
showing intentional restraint or being “over-cautious,”306 and therefore
become more likely to use violence.
Although widespread citizen recording might occasionally make an
officer hesitate, proper training could mitigate this response.307 Even in the
303

See MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 10-402(b) (LexisNexis 2010).
See Kreimer, supra note 26, at 370–74.
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See CLAUDE L. VINCENT, POLICE OFFICER 66 (1990).
306
See Benjamin J. Goold, Public Area Surveillance and Police Work: The Impact of CCTV on
Police Behaviour and Autonomy, 1 SURVEILLANCE & SOC’Y 191, 197 (2003) (arguing that deterrence
might make the police overly cautious and more vulnerable).
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CATO Video, supra note 22, at 43:40 (statement of Maj. Neal Franklin, former Maryland State
Police and Baltimore City Police Officer). The actual video footage captured by citizens can also be
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absence of such training, it is more likely that “most officers will [not] shirk
their clear duty to enforce the law and fight crime simply because there is a
channel through which citizens can be assured of a fair hearing of
grievances.”308 The risk of overdeterrence decreases even more if the police
also do their own recording because it enables them to defend their actions
if they are improperly accused of misconduct.
B. Recording Can Be Dangerous
Citizen-recording of the police could—but need not—subject the
recorder or the officer to danger. For example, a citizen could be exposed to
considerable risk if a police officer mistakes a camera or cellular phone for
a gun and shoots the recorder as a result of a split-second decision.309 Or, a
videographer could potentially distract an officer, leading to an error that
harms an investigation or results in injury.310 However, the police are
frequently called upon to make split-second decisions in potentially
dangerous and distracting circumstances. Allowing citizens to record police
conduct noninvasively is not necessarily more distracting or dangerous than
anything else the police might encounter.311
In addition, many police are already consistently recorded. Not only do
some police departments record officers using car-mounted cameras,312 but
some also even permit television shows like COPS to videotape them for

used to help train officers and prevent misconduct. Skehill, supra note 55, at 1004. In addition, the
citizens themselves can be trained to safely and effectively record police conduct without interfering
with police work. See Will Connaghan, Commentary, ACLU Will Help Citizens Be ‘Vigilant,’ DAILY
RECORD (St. Louis, Mo.), June 20, 2007, at 1.
308
See GROSS & REITMAN, supra note 191, at 28 (arguing in favor of creating independent civilian
review boards for police). The arguments made by police unions against civilian review boards, id.,
were remarkably similar to current public policy arguments against allowing citizens to freely record
police conduct.
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to be a shooter’s stance. Shots were fired, and 25-year-old Marquise Hudspeth was killed; shot eight
times in the back.”); Nicole Tsong & Warren Cornwall, Boy, 13, Shot After Officer Mistakes Cell For
Weapon, SEATTLE TIMES, Oct. 15, 2007, at A1 (“A Seattle police officer shot a 13-year-old twice in the
leg early Sunday, and police said he had mistaken the boy’s cellphone for a weapon.”).
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Jane Musgrave, Mom Who Videotaped Boynton Cops Sues over Arrest, PALM BEACH POST (July
30, 2010, 9:59 PM), http://www.palmbeachpost.com/news/mom-who-videotaped-boynton-cops-suesover-arrest-833123.html; see also Brief of Appellees, supra note 35 (recognizing the possibility that
recording the police may be distracting); Goold, supra note 306, at 194–95 (same).
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e.g., ROB C. MAWBY, POLICING IMAGES 160 (2002); Goldsmith, supra note 33, at 926; Skehill, supra
note 55, at 1004.
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See, e.g., Lisa Halverstadt, Glendale Police Cars Will Get Dash-Mounted Cameras,
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the purposes of entertainment.313 Surely police officers would not expose
themselves (and by extension their families and friends) to unnecessary
danger for the sake of entertainment. Nor can one argue that these two
examples share the element of awareness and are therefore safer than
citizens recording the police with cell phones because an awareness of
ubiquitous citizen recording can be instilled in young officers during
training.314
C. Institutionalization of Distrust
The police depend on the public’s cooperation to conduct their police
work effectively,315 and as such, they fear an “institutionalization of
distrust.”316 Evidence suggests that the public reacts negatively to footage of
police misconduct,317 making people less likely to cooperate with police
when called upon to do so. This problem is exacerbated when a large
number of people view the footage in a short time period,318 in a “viral”
YouTube video, for example. Some argue that once the public develops
negative feelings towards the police it is nearly impossible to reverse those
feelings319 because these videos, once posted, do not simply disappear from
the Internet.320
However, if the police footage reinforces the desired belief that the
police generally keep the public safe and protected, then recording and
sharing footage of police conduct may actually improve the public’s
perception of them.321 This, in turn, may increase the public’s willingness to
cooperate in police investigations. In fact, actively suppressing video
recording of the police might also silence positive messages of police
heroism and bravery,322 which does not help the reputation the police are
313
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justifiably trying to cultivate and sustain. Even if some of the videos are
negative, arresting the recorder makes the police look even worse, further
undermining their efforts to curry favor with the public. Allowing citizens
to record the police is more likely to decrease the potential for “negative”
videos because the act of recording will itself serve to decrease instances of
police misconduct323—more transparency creates additional means for
recourse in the (increasingly unlikely) event that misconduct does occur.324
D. Video Is Inaccurate
Finally, some argue that the accuracy of the video footage captured is a
concern. Admittedly, the camera is a technologically limited instrument for
capturing an event or series of events.325 Some also argue that the accuracy
of the footage may be limited by the intentional or unintentional bias of the
videographer:326 the camera operator may start the filming too late, focus on
a particular element of the scene, or stop the filming too early,327 ultimately
creating an incomplete but highly persuasive depiction of what occurred.328
One remedy for the police officers’ fear that false footage will spread
and harm their reputations is that police officers, as citizens, can file
lawsuits against other citizens who publish intentionally inaccurate
footage.329 This serves two useful purposes without infringing First
Amendment rights. First, the threat of being sued for publishing distorting
footage might discourage wanton recording of police officers. Second, it
would encourage the police to record their interactions with the public to
create positive counterevidence.
Actively encouraging the police to record their interactions with the
public benefits all parties involved because it increases the likelihood that

kitten-from-sewer (“In a scene that might be reminiscent of an episode of MacGyver, Tampa Police
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the “entire” scene is captured.330 This evidence would be useful not only to
police in their efforts to disclaim improper conduct, but also to the citizens
who experienced the conduct. There are a number of ways the police could
record these interactions to obtain counterevidence, some of which are
already being implemented: car-mounted cameras,331 cameras on Tasers332
and guns,333 and even cameras mounted on the officers’ bodies.334 This
additional footage can mitigate accuracy issues because it will paint a far
more complete picture than footage from any single source.335
In sum, “no matter how well the police do their job . . . many
people . . . will view them with animosity.”336 It is therefore better to have
more information than less, because more members of the public will view
the police positively when there is greater evidence showing that most
police officers are properly and justly doing their jobs. And, when evidence
shows that the police cannot be trusted, the police will have every incentive
to improve their performance.
CONCLUSION
The police protect and serve, but in the rare cases in which they do not,
they are not entitled to violate the Constitution by cloaking their misconduct
in secrecy. Individuals have a constitutionally protected right to record and
disseminate video footage of their police officers. This right is encapsulated
in the First Amendment’s protection of free speech and a free press, and the
rights to gather information, redress grievances, expressive conduct, and be
free from prior restraint. Court rulings (and legislative activity) should
affirm this right337 and, ideally, set standards under which the police may
justifiably and constitutionally prevent citizens from capturing and
transmitting video footage. Although there are facially valid reasons to
suppress this type of speech, those arguments are outweighed by arguments
in favor of expanding speech and the public’s access to safe, socially
responsible policing.
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